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COMMENTS
The Acquisition, Abandonment, and Preservation of Rail
Corridors in North Carolina: A Historical Review and
Contemporary Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
As the twentieth century winds down, the fate of hundreds of
rail corridors across the country remains uncertain as railroads
discontinue unprofitable services and abandon underutilized rights
of way.' Since railroading historically has been a speculative
enterprise, once lucrative lines may no longer warrant continued
investment by railroad corporations as revenues produced by these
routes decline.2 Furthermore, competition from trucks operating on
heavily subsidized, publicly owned roads has contributed to the need
for increased consolidation of routes. In response to these economic
1. Of the 5522 miles of North Carolina rail corridors active in 1920, only 3655
remained intact in 1993. See N.C. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NORTH CAROLINA'S RAIL SYSTEM:
1993 AND BEYOND 22 (1994) [hereinafter 1993 AND BEYOND]. Of those, fewer than 2144
miles were subject to sale, lease, service change, or loss in 1993. See id. Nationwide, only
141,000 miles of rail corridors remained in 1990, down from a peak mileage in 1920 of
272,000. See Theodore G. Phillips, Note, Beyond 16 U.S.C. §1247(d): The Scope of
Congress's Power to Preserve Railroad Rights-of-Way, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 907, 907
(1991) (citing Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 5 (1990)). Nationally, it has been estimated
that about 3000 miles of additional right of way will be lost irretrievably every year until
the year 2000. See id.
2. See Steven R. Wild, A History of Railroad Abandonments, 23 TRANSP. LJ. 1, 1-2
(1995); see also MICHAEL CONANT, RAILROAD MERGERS AND ABANDONMENTS 18-24
(1964) (explaining the historical causes and effects of railroad overinvestment in route
capacity). Although exploring the economic forces driving railroad investment and
disinvestment reach beyond the scope of this Comment, the fiscal determinants of rail line
abandonments can best be summarized as follows:
Excess capacity and overinvestment in railroad lines and terminals waste
economic resources in two ways. The first is the original cost of underused lines
and terminals which, of course, cannot be recovered. The second economic waste
is the cost of maintaining and servicing this excess capacity, which is reflected in
unnecessarily high railroad rates. This can be remedied only by consolidations or
coordinated joint use of facilities.
CONANT, supra, at 21.
3. See Charles IL Montange, Conserving Rail Corridors, 10 TEND. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 139, 140 (1991); Wild, supra note 2, at 6-7; see also CONANT, supra note 2, at 115-
18 (discussing other factors contributing to rail line abandonments). The subsidization of
roads and highways occurs at many levels:
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forces, a railroad will usually discontinue service over a line, cut back
maintenance, and remove and sell the rails and other equipment
from the right of way.' By abandoning a corridor, the railroad will
shed local property tax liability5 and avoid the risk of incurring tort
liability for accidents that may occur on unused rights of way.' An
abandonment saves a railroad between $18,000 and $24,000 per mile
per year.'
It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of unused
railroad rights of way to planning organizations nationwide. An
intact, contiguous corridor is ideal for future intercity and intracity
rail passenger services, roads, highways, power and
telecommunications lines, and recreational trails.8 When originally
acquired, many of these rights of way ran through undeveloped,
As to maintenance-of-way expenses, railroads ordinarily are responsible for
maintenance of rail lines from revenue derived from shippers and must pay taxes
on their rights-of-way. In contrast, trucks and other road vehicles are generally
believed to pay only a portion of their share of roadway costs, and that portion is
paid only indirectly through fuel taxes, rather than user fees. Further, roadways
are publicly owned and are not subject to tax.
Montange, supra, at 140 n.8.
4. See Wild, supra note 2, at 2. The larger railroads in the country have turned to
corporate mergers since 1960 to achieve greater economic efficiencies and to lower costs.
See CONANT, supra note 2, at 69-90; Michael W. Blaszak, Megamergers to the Far
Horizon, TRAINS, Apr. 1997, at 36, 37-39, 41. Often, these mergers lead to route
consolidations and abandonments, especially where parallel lines are merged. See
CONANT, supra note 2, at 69. Increased merger activity in recent years has increased the
likelihood of further corridor abandonments. See generally THEODORE E. KEELER,
RAmROADS, FREIGHT, AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 36-38 (1983) (providing a historical
background of the federal government's regulation of railroad mergers); Blaszak, supra, at
36-46 (discussing recent and potential railroad mergers); Railroad Monopoly Might End,
NEws AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 2, 1997, at A2 (reporting on the impending
division of Conrail between CSX Corporation and Norfolk Southern Corporation).
5. See Wild, supra note 2, at 2; Phillips, supra note 1, at 908. But see Memorandum
from Jeff BandinL Rail Division, North Carolina Department of Transportation
("NCDOT"), to Grayson Kelley, Deputy Attorney General, Transportation Section,
North Carolina Department of Justice ("NCDOJ") (June 12, 1996) (on file with Rail
Division, NCDOT) (noting that property taxation is a very minor factor in railroads'
abandonment decisions in North Carolina).
6. See Wild, supra note 2, at 2; Phillips, supra note 1, at 908.
7. See Wild, supra note 2, at 2. For an interesting discussion of the political and
regulatory obstacles to railroad abandonments in general, see id, at 1-10.
8. See JOSEPH VRANICH, SUPERTRAINS 149 (1991) (discussing planned use of
existing Florida rail line for future Supertrain project); Montange, supra note 3, at 139;
Samuel R. Morgan, Rails to Trails: On the Right Track, PROB. & PROP., Oct. 8, 1994, at
10, 10; Wild, supra note 2, at 11. See generally F. Kaid Benfield, Running on Empty: The
Case for a Sustainable National Transportation System, 25 ENVTL. L 651 (1995)
(discussing and recommending solutions to the economic, social, and environmental costs
of the transportation system in the United States today).
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rural areas.9 Partly because of the regional economic prosperity
spurred by the construction of the railroads, these lines now traverse
some of the most costly real estate in urban America." To replicate
today in a newly established corridor the access to population
densities and industries enjoyed by long-established railroad rights of
way would likely be cost-prohibitive." Recognizing this reality, state
and local transportation planners have sought to acquire old
corridors when their integrity appears threatened by potential
abandonment.u On the other hand, property rights advocates are
also hard at work, representing landowners who claim interests in
unused rights of way.' Often caught in the middle, railroads may not
necessarily side with the public interest, especially when adjacent
property owners block the alternative uses of intact corridors by
outbidding preservation groups vying to purchase inactive lines.'
9. See Wild, supra note 2, at 2; Phillips, supra note 1, at 925.
10. See id.; FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE TRANSIT CAPITAL
COST PRICE INDEX STUDY § 4-14, Exhibit 5.11 (1995) [hereinafter PRICE INDEX STUDY]
(on file with Rail Division, NCDO1) (estimating the cost of new right of way acquisition
for heavy rail systems in the United States to increase by 50% between the years 1994 and
2003).
11. See Wild, supra note 2, at 2; Phillips, supra note 1, at 925 ("The cost of purchasing
rights-of-way, especially through developed areas, would be so immense that preserving
existing rights-of-way may be the only economically feasible way in which the government
can meet future mass transportation needs."); PRICE INDEX STUDY, supra note 10, § 4-14,
Exhibit 5.11; see also VRANICH, supra note 8, at 149 (discussing economic value of existing
railroad rights of way for development of future high-speed trains in Florida). Judicial
recognition of the potential importance of railroad rights of way in the future appeared as
early as 1973:
To assemble a right of way in our increasingly populous nation is no longer
simple. A scarcity of fuel and the adverse consequences of too many motor
vehicles suggest that society may someday have need either for railroads or for
the rights of way over which they have been built. A federal agency charged with
designing part of our transportation policy does not overstep its authority when it
prudently undertakes to minimize the destruction of available transportation
corridors painstakingly created over several generations.
Reed v. Meserve, 487 F.2d 646, 649-50 (5th Cir. 1973). As the nation's population
becomes increasingly concentrated in densely developed urban areas, not only will demand
for renewed rail services grow, but the economic and practical feasibility of offering these
services will also improve significantly. See VRANICH, supra note 8, at 10 (discussing the
potential benefits associated with developing high-speed rail systems in the United States).
12. See Morgan, supra note 8, at 10; Wild, supra note 2, at 11-13. Considering that
only about 15-20% of all railroad corridors threatened with abandonment are being
preserved, it is easy to recognize the urgent attention this issue demands. See Montange,
supra note 3, at 167.
13. See Morgan, supra note 8, at 10; Karen Ann Coburn, Trails on Trial, GOVERNING,
Aug. 1996, at 43,43-44.
14. See Montange, supra note 3, at 17 ("Some railroads, unfortunately, do not share
the public's desire to facilitate such alternative uses as recreational trail uses."). Noting
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Faced with these competing interests, legislators and courts struggle
to fashion fair and equitable solutions to this vexing problem.
This Comment will focus on the legal issues related to rail
corridor preservation in North Carolina. Part II will explore the
facts of a potentially litigious situation in southeastern North
Carolina to provide some context for the remainder of the
discussion.' Part III of this Comment will briefly outline the
interaction between state and federal laws as they relate to right of
way abandonment and preservation.16 In Part IV, the discussion will
focus on what property interests a railroad may take for its right of
way, devoting special attention to the historical development of
modem principles in this area of the law.' Part V will review the law
of abandonment in North Carolina and attempt to clarify what acts
constitute abandonment in light of unclear case law on the subject.18
In Part VI, the Comment will turn to the state's constitutional power
to alter or destroy reversionary interests in property." This section
will also examine the "public highway" doctrine, a common law
precept empowering the state to preserve railroad easements for any
future transportation purpose without compensating underlying fee
owners. Part VII will conclude by illuminating the most important
implications of the preceding analysis, particularly as they relate to
the fact situation presented in Part 11.20
II. WALLACE-CASTLE HAYNE CORRIDOR
A. Facts
Efforts to preserve railroad rights of way across the country
the importance of the type of interest originally acquired by a railroad for its corridors,
United States District Judge Malcolm J. Howard succinctly characterized the position of
railroads in the property rights fervor surrounding right of way preservation:
Of course, from the railroad's point of view either a fee or an easement would
serve its purposes equally well. As long as it simply ran trains over the right-of-
way it was protected by statute, and no party could have adversely possessed
against whatever interest it held. Quite likely the railroad did not give any
further thought to the precise interest that it held.
Love v. United States, 889 F. Supp. 1548,1581 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
15. See infra notes 23-60 and accompanying text. Although, as of publication, no
complaint has been filed in the southeastern North Carolina dispute, the potential for a
lawsuit cannot be ignored.
16. See infra notes 61-110 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 111-62 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 163-225 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 226-346 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 347 and accompanying text.
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continue to flourish despite resistance from property rights groups
and adverse landowners.2' Growth pressures and a dwindling supply
of available land have spurred intense preservation initiatives in
rapidly urbanizing states such as North Carolina.' Congress and
state legislatures have responded to these public interests by enacting
statutes designed specifically to prevent the disappearance of vast
right of way networks around the nation.' The Wallace-Castle
Hayne corridor in southeastern North Carolina represents only a
short link in this larger system. Still, the history of this corridor's
formation, use, and deactivation sheds light on some of the legal
issues that may arise from public attempts to save threatened rights
of way.
Chartered by the North Carolina General Assembly in 1833,'
the Wilmington & Raleigh Railroad was originally intended to
connect Wilmington, North Carolina's busiest port city, with the
state's capital in Raleigh.' When support for the venture failed to
materialize among residents in Raleigh, the General Assembly
amended the railroad charter in 1835 to allow the line to be built
from Wilmington to Weldon, North Carolina, near the Virginia
border." The railroad was renamed the Wilmington & Weldon
Railroad in 1855.' Construction on the 161.5 miles of rights of way
and track structures between Wilmington and Weldon was
21. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; infra notes 93-97 and accompanying
text.
22. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing rail corridor preservation
efforts in North Carolina).
23. For a more thorough explanation of existing statutes, see infra notes 75-97 and
accompanying text.
24. See An Act to Incorporate the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company, Priv.
L, ch. 78 (1833); WILLIAM S. POWELL, NORTH CAROLINA THROUGH FOUR CENTURIES
286 (1989). See generally S. DAVID CARRIKER, NORTH CAROLINA RAILROADS: THE
COMMON CARRIER RAILROADS OF NORTH CAROLINA (1989) (providing historical
timeline for the formation and dissolution of railroad corporations in North Carolina).
25. See CHARLES KERNAN, RAILS TO WEEDS: SEARcHiNG OUT THE GHOST
RAILROADS AROUND WILMINGTON 4 (1988); PoWELL, supra note 24, at 286.
26. See An Act to Amend An Act Passed in Eighteen Hundred and Thirty Three,
Entitled An Act to Incorporate the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company, Priv. L,
ch. 30 (1835); CHARLES Kernan, Rails to Weeds) Searching OUT the Ghost Railroads
AROUND WILMINGTON 4 (1988); POWELL, supra note 24, at 286.
27. See An Act Concerning the Wilmington & Raleigh Railroad Company, Priv. L,
ch. 235, § 2 (1855); CARRIKER, supra note 24; CHARLES Kernan, Rails to Weeds:
Searching OUT the Ghost Railroads AROUND WILMINGTON 4 (1988); POwELL, supra note
24, at 286. Hereinafter, for the sake of simplicity, this Comment will refer only to the
Wilmington & Weldon Railroad, even when discussing the original Wilmington & Raleigh
charter.
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completed on March 7, 1840, making it the longest railroad in the
world at that time.' By the latter part of the century, the railroad
stretched from Weldon to Columbia, South Carolina.'
The Wilmington & Weldon acquired part of the land needed to
build its railroad by exercising the power of eminent domain, which
the state granted to the corporation in the railroad's legislative
articles of incorporation. " Thus, the only recourse for private
landowners unwilling to part with their land along the proposed
route was to seek fair and just compensation in court for the taking
of their property for public use.' As with the condemnation power
28. See KERNAN, supra note 25, at 4; CHARLES Kernan, Rails to WEEDS:
SEARcHING OUT THE GHOST RAILRoADs AROUND WILMINGTON 4 (1988); POWELL,
supra note 24, at 287.
29. See KERNAN, supra note 25, at 4; see also CEcAL K. BRoWN, A STATE
MOVEMENT IN RAIROAD DEVELOPMENT. THE STORY OF NORTH CAROIUNA'S FIRST
EFFORT TO ESTABLISH AN EAST AND WEST TRUNK LINE RAILROAD 31-44 (1928)
(providing a detailed history of the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad).
30. See An Act to Incorporate the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company, Priv.
L, ch. 78, arts. 14, 18 (1833) (granting and describing the power of eminent domain). The
charter also enabled the railroad to take and hold land by purchase or agreement with
landowners and by gift or devise. See Ud, arts. 13, 15; see also infra notes 134-39 and
accompanying text (discussing methods by which railroads may acquire property).
31. See An Act to Incorporate the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company, Priv.
L, ch. 78, arts. 14,18 (describing proceedings for valuing and paying for condemned land).
Although the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation to the landowner, see U.S.
CONsT. amend. V, this amendment was not applied to the states until the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted in 1868, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Glen E. Summers,
Private Property Without Lochner: Toward a Takings Jurisprudence Uncorrupted by
Substantive Due Process, 142 U. PA. L REV. 837, 842 (1993). Similarly, the 1776 North
Carolina Constitution contained no explicit protection for private property. See N.C.
CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RTS. § 12 ("That no freeman ought to be taken,
imprisoned or desiessed of his Freehold, Liberties or Privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or
in any Manner destroyed or deprived of his Life Liberty or Property, but by the Law of the
Land."); JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROUNA STATE CONSTITUTION WITH HISTORY
AND COMMENTARY 55 (1995). Despite the absence of express application to the states,
the precept embodied in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
controlled the thinking of early nineteenth century jurists and legislators in North
Carolina, as indicated in Raleigh & Gaston Railroad v. Davis, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 431
(1837):
If [the principle of just compensation] be not incorporated [in the North Carolina
Constitution], the omission must be attributed to the belief of the founders of the
government, that the legislature would never perpetrate so flagrant an act of
gross oppression, or that it would not be tolerated by the people, but be redressed
by the next representatives chosen.
Id. at 439. The court discussed at length just compensation and its absence from the North
Carolina Constitution, see id. at 439-41, but refused to hold on the matter because a statute
provided for compensation for property taken by the railroad, see id. at 441. See also
Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N.C. 550, 555 (1874) ("Notwithstanding there is no clause in the
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granted to most quasi-public32 corporations such as railroads, the
state placed certain restrictions on the enjoyment of the property so
acquired by the Wilmington & Weldon to ensure that no private
taking occurred devoid of a public purpose.3 The railroad's original
charter specifically delimited the corporation's powers, including
implicitly the power of eminent domain, in its first article by
requiring that the power be exercised only for "the purpose of
effecting a communication by a rail road" between Wilmington and
Raleigh.' 4 Restrictions such as this could complicate attempts to use
such rights of way for nonrailroad purposes. 5
In 1989, CSX Transportation Corporation ("CSX"), the
modem-day successor to the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad,3"
discontinued service and pulled up its tracks37 on a portion of the
Constitution of North Carolina which expressly" prohibits private property from being
taken for public use without compensation... ,yet the principle is so grounded in natural
equity that it has never been denied to be a part of the law of North Carolina."); ORTH,
supra, at 58 (quoting the above statement by Justice Rodman in Johnson v. Rankin);
Gerald Corbett Parker, Note, Eminent Domain in North Carolina-A Case Study, 35 N.C.
L REV. 296, 298-300 (1957) (discussing property owners' implied right to compensation
under the Constitution of North Carolina).
32. Railroads and other private corporations providing public services have often been
referred to as quasi-public entities. See infra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
33. See N.C. State Highway Comm'n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 468, 189
S.E.2d 272, 278 (1972) ("Any exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to the
constitutional prohibition against the taking of property for private uses."); Shields v.
Norfolk & Carolina R.R., 129 N.C. 1, 7,39 S.E. 582,584 (1901) (holding that railroads may
not use condemnation as "a means of acquiring property for the benefit of the
corporation"); see also 1 ISAAC F. REDFIELD, THE LAW OF RAILWAYS § 61, at 234 n.4
(5th ed. 1873) (discussing possible limitation that a railroad may acquire land by
agreement only for limited purposes and not for private use).
34. An Act to Incorporate the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company, Priv. L,
ch. 78, art. 1 (1833).
35. See infra notes 323-36 and accompanying text.
36. The Wilmington & Weldon Railroad merged with other railroads in the region in
1900 to form the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad ("ACL"). See KERNAN, supra note 25, at
4. The ACL merged with the Seaboard Air Line in 1967 to form the Seaboard Coast Line
("SCL"). See id. The SCL eventually combined with the Chessie System in 1986 to create
CSX. See id.; see also CARRIKER, supra note 24 (providing a historical timeline for the
establishment of railroad corporations in North Carolina).
37. The term "abandonment" connotes the legal termination of a railroad's interest in
property. See generally 1 JAMES A. WEBSTER, JR., WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA § 15-29 (Patrick K Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 4th ed.
1994 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the law of abandonment in North Carolina); BLACK'S LAW
DiCrONARY 3 (6th ed. 1990) (" 'Abandoned property' in a legal sense is that to which the
owner has relinquished all right, title, claim, and possession, but without vesting it in any
other person, and with intention of not reclaiming it or resuming its ownership, possession
or enjoyment in the future."). "Abandonment" does not necessarily occur with the mere
discontinuance of service or the removal of tracks from a railroad corridor. See infra notes
184-225 and accompanying text (discussing factors suggesting an intent to abandon). As
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original Wilmington & Weldon line between Wallace and Castle
Hayne, North Carolina, two towns located north of Wilmington."
No longer needing twenty-eight miles of the right of way, " CSX
donated it to the North Carolina Department of Transportation
("NCDOT") in 1994.40 The state's interest in the corridor lay in its
potential for future intercity and intracity rail passenger service to
and within the Wilmington metropolitan region.41 The right of way
would also provide a critical link between the state port in
Wilmington and the proposed Global TransPark near Kinston.2
such, "abandonment" will be used herein only in reference to a railroad's intentional
relinquishment of its property rights.
38. Telephone Interview with Mark B. Sullivan, Planning Section Chief, Rail Division,
NCDOT (Feb. 3,1997) (on file with author).
39. Although the term "right of way" is generally used to refer to the right of one
party to pass over the property of another, in railroad law "right of way" is used to
describe the land upon which tracks and structures are built. See New Mexico v. United
States Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1898) (discussing use of term "right of way" in
general with regard to railroads); McCotter v. Barnes, 247 N.C. 480, 485, 101 S.E.2d 330,
334 (1958) (explaining that the term "right of way" may "designate an easement, and,
apart from that, it may be used as descriptive of the use or purpose to which a strip of land
is put"); BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY, supra note 37, at 1326 (stating that "right of way,"
in the railroad context, refers to the land itself, not the right of passage over it). Railroad
rights of way, therefore, may be held in fee or easement. For an interesting discussion of
the use of the term "right of way" in deeds as conveying either an easement or fee simple
estate, see City Motel, Inc. v. State, 336 P.2d 375, 377 (Nev. 1959) (citing authorities for
both views). See generally An Act to Incorporate the Asheville and Tennessee Railroad
Company, Priv. L., ch. 340, § 9 (1887) (using terms "right of way" and "land" to distinguish
between taking of easements and fee simple estates); Town of Morganton v. Hutton &
Bourbonnais Co., 251 N.C. 531, 534, 112 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1960) (noting the distinction
between use of "land" and "easement" in municipal enabling statutes authorizing the
power of eminent domain).
40. See Quitclaim Deed by CSX Transportation to North Carolina Department of
Transportation (Aug. 4,1994) (on file with Rail Division, NCDOT); see also Memorandum
from Patrick B. Simmons, Director, Rail Division, NCDOT, to D.J. Bowers, Third Division
Engineer, Planning and Environmental Branch, NCDOT (Aug. 3, 1995) [hereinafter
Simmons Memo] (on fie with Rail Division, NCDOT) (providing a general history of
NCDOT's involvement in the Wallace-Castle Hayne corridor).
41. See Simmons Memo, supra note 40 (discussing potential uses for the Wallace-
Castle Hayne Corridor); Memorandum from Mark B. Sullivan, Planner, Rail Program,
NCDOT, to Larry Sams, NCDOT (Apr. 20, 1990) (on file with Rail Division, NCDOT)
(discussing criteria and objectives for rail corridor acquisition by the state).
42. See Memorandum from James E. Brown, Director of Planning, North Carolina
State Ports Authority, to Mark B. Sullivan, Planner, Rail Division, NCDOT (Nov. 15,
1993) (on file with Rail Division, NCDOT) (emphasizing the urgency of acquiring the
Wallace-Castle Hayne Corridor for further development of the state port in Wilmington);
Memorandum from James E. Brown, Director of Planning, North Carolina State Ports
Authority, to Mark B. Sullivan, Planner, Rail Division, NCDOT (Oct. 27, 1993) (on file
with Rail Division, NCDOT) (discussing the economic impact that the Wallace-Castle
Hayne Corridor could have on Wilmington's port); Simmons Memo, supra note 40.
The Global TransPark represents, a new concept in industrial design in which
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Until increased demand warranted public investment in these
services, NCDOT has considered the possibility of establishing
interim recreational trail uses on the corridor.43
Soon after CSX removed its tracks from the corridor in 1989,
property owners along the right of way began claiming ownership of
the now vacant land.' In some cases, property owners openly
possessed parts of the corridor, some building structures on the land
and others removing tons of ballast from the inactive roadbed. 4
manufacturing plants and warehouses are integrated with air, rail, and highway facilities to
maximize the international delivery of parts and goods in a timely fashion. See David
Ranil, A First Look at Global TransPark Plans, NEws AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
May 13,1993, at C6. To be located near Kinston, North Carolina, the 15,000-acre complex
promises to generate nearly 50,000 jobs statewide within 20 years of its completion. See
Draft Plan for Cargo Airport and Industrial Park Released Kinston's Global TransPark,
NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 22, 1994, at B6; see also Dudley Price, Delay
of Global TransPark Study Stalls Progress, NEWs AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 7,
1996, at D1 (reporting on delay of environmental study); Dudley Price, Global TransPark:
Little to Show for $15 Million, NEws AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 24, 1996, at
Al (questioning the legitimacy and fiscal management of the Global TransPark
Authority). See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 63A-1 to -25 (1994) (creating the Global
TransPark Authority).
43. See Simmons Memo, supra note 40; see also infra notes 75-97 and accompanying
text (discussing relevant interim use legislation).
44. See, e.g., Letter from landowner to Trice Lambert, Planner, Rail Division,
NCDOT (circa 1995) (on file with Rail Division, NCDOT) (claiming to have used the
corridor since 1990 for an access road); Letter from attorney to E. Burke Haywood,
Assistant Attorney General, NCDOJ (Aug. 17,1995) [hereinafter Letter from Attorney to
Haywood] (on file with Rail Division, NCDOT) (requesting information for clients
claiming ownership of the right of way).
45. Among other encroachments on the right of way, a paper company has removed
timber from the corridor, hunting clubs have begun using the property as hunting
preserves, and one adjacent landowner sold a parcel of the corridor to her daughter for
$1.00. See Memorandum from Trice Lambert, Planner, Rail Division, NCDOT, to Patrick
B. Simmons, Director, Rail Division, NCDOT (Oct. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Lambert
Memo] (on file with Rail Division, NCDOT). Despite such acts, these individuals could
never acquire title to the right of way by adverse possession if a court found the corridor
still to be intact (i.e., not abandoned), regardless of whether the state or the railroad
owned the right of way. See N.C. G N. STAT. § 1-44 (1996) (barring adverse possession of
railroad rights of way); id. § 1-45 (barring adverse possession of public ways); see also
McLaurin v. Winston-Salem Southbound Ry., 323 N.C. .609, 612, 374 S.E.2d 265, 267
(1988) (holding that North Carolina General Statutes § 1-44's protection of railroads
against adverse possession claims is not limited to situations where the railroad is using the
property); infra notes 190-191 and accompanying text (discussing effect of adverse
possession on the common-law abandonment determination). Still, for liability reasons
and because of its interest in protecting the physical integrity of the right of way as well as
any property on it, the state has actively discouraged trespassing and theft on the corridor.
See Simmons Memo, supra note 40 (suggesting, among other things, the possibility that the
NCDOT use portions of the right of way to store materials to provide a means of policing
the corridor). But see Lambert Memo, supra (expressing doubt as to the effectiveness of
the state's policing efforts).
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These landowners presumed CSX had held the corridor in easement
and that the easement terminated" upon discontinuance of service
over the right of way.47 However, when CSX quitclaimed the
46. Courts and commentators frequently refer to the termination of an easement as a
"reversion" of the right of way to adjacent property owners. See, e.g., Preseault v. ICC,
494 U.S. 1, 16 (1990); Fritsch v. ICC, 59 F.3d 248, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1262 (1996); Love v. United States, 889 F. Supp. 1548,1574 (E.D.N.C. 1994); McKinley
v. Waterloo R.R., 368 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Iowa 1985); International Paper Co. v. Hufham,
81 N.C. App. 606, 607, 345 S.E2d 231, 232 (1986); AM. Swarthout, Annotation, Who
Entitled [sic] to Land upon its Abandonment for Railroad Purposes, Where Railroad's
Original Interest or Title Was Less than Fee Simple Absolute, 136 A.LR. 296, 297 (1942).
Technically, though, the term "reversion" applies only when a future interest attached to
an estate reverts to the grantor or his successors in interest after the happening of some
event. See 2 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 24-22; BLACK's LAW DICrlONARY, supra note
37, at 1320; see also Torrence v. City of Charlotte, 163 N.C. 562, 565, 80 S.E. 53, 54 (1913)
(correcting the plaintiff's misuse of the term "reversion" in reference to the cessation of an
easement).
47. See Letter from Attorney to Haywood, supra note 44; Letter from attorney to
Trice Lambert, Planner, Rail Division, NCDOT (Dec. 20, 1995) [hereinafter Letter from
Attorney to Lambert] (on file with Rail Division, NCDOT). Some landowners acted
pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes § 1-44.2, which presumes ownership of
abandoned railroad easements to the centerline of the right of way in adjacent property
owners. See Letter from Attorney to Lambert, supra; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 144.2
(containing ownership presumption). The North Carolina Supreme Court found this
statute unconstitutional to the extent that it bars claims of individuals holding record title
in possession under the one-year statute of limitations contained in § 1-44.2. See
McDonald's Corp. v. Dwyer, 338 N.C. 445, 451, 450 S.E.2d 888, 892 (1994) (holding that
North Carolina General Statutes § 144.2(b) deprives some persons with legitimate claims
of entitlement proper notice, thereby violating due process guarantees); cf. Congleton v.
City of Asheboro, 8 N.C. App. 571, 574, 174 S.E.2d 870, 872 (1970) (" 'The purpose of a
statute of limitations is to afford security against stale demands, not to deprive anyone of
his rights by lapse of time.'" (quoting Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 371, 98 S.E.2d 508,
514 (1957))). But see Dwyer, 338 N.C. at 451-52, 450 S.E.2d at 893-94 (Exum, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the rebuttable presumption raised by § 1-44.2 destroys no vested
rights, provides adequate notice to affected parties, and clearly falls within the
legislature's authority to require periodic filings to preserve one's rights); cf. Texaco, Inc.
v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 526 (1982) (holding with regard to a similar limitations statute in
Indiana that, "just as a State may create a property interest that is entitled to
constitutional protection, the State has the power to condition the permanent retention of
that property right on the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present
intention to retain the interest"); Shearin, 246 N.C. at 370, 98 S.E.2d at 514 ("Statutes of
limitations are inflexible and unyielding. They operate inexorably without reference to the
merits of plaintiff's cause of action. They are statutes of repose, intended to require that
litigation be initiated within the prescribed time or not at all."); Swarthout, supra note 46,
at 301 (noting that the legislature may determine to whom a railroad right of way belongs
upon its abandonment, and citing Smith v. Hall, 72 N.W. 427 (Iowa 1897)). The North
Carolina statute, however, remains effective in establishing a presumption of ownership in
adjacent landowners of abandoned easements. See Dwyer, 338 N.C. at 451, 450 S.E.2d at
892; see also 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-29 (Supp. 1996) (discussing § 144.2 and
Dwyer); Abandoned Railroad Easements-Adoining Landowners May Not Be The New
Owners, N.C. FARM BUREAU NEWS, May 1995, at 18, 18-19 (discussing implications of
Dwyer for adjacent landowners).
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corridor in 1994 to the state, the NCDOT assumed that the corridor
had been held in fee simple absolute by the railroad, thus negating
any claims by private landowners along the route.'
Upon acquiring the corridor in 1994, the NCDOT filed in each
of the relevant county land records offices "intents to preserve' 9 the
corridor and began posting "no trespassing" notices along the right
of way." It also contacted encroaching landowners to arrange either
for their vacation of the property or payment to the state for any
commercial use of the corridor." Since that time, several affected
landowners have sought legal representation challenging the state's
right to claim the corridor. 2 Although no court has yet addressed
the legitimacy of the state's interest in the right of way, 3 the outcome
48. See Memorandum from James C. Gulick, Special Deputy Attorney General,
Consumer/Antitrust Section, NCDOJ, to Gene Smith, Senior Deputy Attorney General,
Highway Section, NCDOJ (Dec. 7, 1990) (on file with Rail Division, NCDOT); Letter
from E. Burke Haywood, Assistant Attorney General, NCDOJ, to attorney (Aug. 25,
1995) (on file with Rail Division, NCDOT). Uncertainty as to the title held by the railroad
arises from the ambiguous language in the original Wilmington & Weldon charter. See An
Act to Incorporate the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company, Priv. L., ch. 78, art. 14
(1833). The charter granted the railroad the authority to hold condemned land "as though
[it] owned the fee simple therein." Id. Whether the railroad acquired the right of way in
fee simple or in some lesser interest according to this language is unclear. The North
Carolina Supreme Court addressed the matter in 1844, holding that the language of the
charter conferred upon the railroad a fee simple absolute in land acquired by eminent
domain. See State v. Rives, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 297, 305 (1844). If this precedent remains in
force today, the NCDOT's claim to the corridor is sound.
49. See Declaration of Intent to Preserve Right of Way for Railroad Purposes by
North Carolina Department of Transportation, Wake County (Oct. 9, 1995); Declaration
of Intent to Preserve Right of Way for Railroad Purposes by North Carolina Department
of Transportation, Duplin, Pender, and New Hanover Counties (Mar. 28,1995). Although
technically unnecessary for rights of way held in fee simple, filing an "intent to preserve"
would help the state rebut any presumptions of abandonment should the state hold a lesser
interest in the corridor. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text (addressing the
presumption of abandonment raised by North Carolina General Statutes § 1-44.2).
50. See Memorandum from Trice Lambert, Planner, Rail Division, NCDOT, to J.B.
Croom et al., Highway Maintenance Engineers, Division of Highways, NCDOT (May 16,
1995) (on file with Rail Division, NCDOT). The NCDOT also published notices and
solicited articles in local newspapers to publicize its acquisition of the corridor. See Notice,
PENDER POST (Pender County, N.C.), Nov. 22,1995, at 13; Patrick Thomas, Rail Corridor
Squatters Need Permits from State, Says DOT Staff Member, PENDER PosT (Pender
County, N.C.), Apr. 19,1995, at 1; Simmons Memo, supra note 40.
51. The NCDOT offered encroaching landowners the opportunity to sign license
agreements subject to termination at any time by the state. See Simmons Memo, supra
note 40.
52. See Letter from Attorney to Haywood, supra note 44; Letter from Attorney to
Lambert, supra note 47 ("I do not believe [the state's claim] to be on a sound legal
basis.").
53. The state may have acquired the right of way by adverse possession under
colorable title pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes § 1-38, which allows persons in
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of such a case could have implications in this and other states where
governmental agencies have attempted to acquire unused corridors
for future public purposes.
B. Issues
The issues raised by the facts of the Wallace-Castle Hayne
corridor dispute reflect the legal difficulties facing efforts to preserve
and utilize unused corridors. The first issue concerns the state of the
title acquired by the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad when it
condemned and purchased the right of way in the early 1800s.' If
the railroad acquired a fee simple title, then the corridor exists in
perpetuity subject to no restrictions on its use.' If a lesser interest
was taken, then it is necessary to determine whether the right of way
has been legally abandoned. 6 The outcome of this latter issue relies
heavily on the fact-finder's determination as to what the railroad
intended by deactivating the right of way.7 If the railroad
abandoned the corridor, then the right of way terminated, leaving an
unencumbered property interest to underlying or adjacent
landowners."
Assuming the railroad had not abandoned the right of way, the
traditional analysis might next consider whether the proposed use for
the corridor places enough of an additional burden on servient or
reversionary interests to warrant compensation under the Fifth
possession and having colorable title to bar entry after seven years. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-38 (1996). CSX quitclaimed the corridor to the state in August 1989, see supra note 40
and accompanying text, at which time the NCDOT initiated efforts to notify the public of
the state's claim. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. By August 1996, the
state's colorable title claim may have ripened under § 1-38. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
38(a). This Comment does not purport to explore the adverse possession argument
thoroughly, it is raised here only as one example of the variety of legal arguments
available to potential litigants.
54. The most common approach taken by courts in disputes between property owners
and successors in interest to railroad rights of way is initially to examine the state of the
title originally acquired by the railroad. See, e.g., McCotter v. Barnes, 247 N.C. 480, 484-
86, 101 S.E.2d 330, 334-35 (1958) (holding that a railroad had acquired a fee simple estate
in a corridor); State v. Rives, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 297, 305 (1844) (construing a charter to
determine whether a railroad had acquired a fee simple by condemnation); International
Paper Co. v. Hufham, 81 N.C. App. 606, 609-11, 345 S.E.2d 231, 233-34 (1986) (finding an
easement in railroad right of way); see also City Motel, Inc. v. State, 336 P.2d 375, 376-78
(Nev. 1959) (construing a deed a to railroad to decide whether an easement or fee simple
estate was conveyed).
55. See infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
56. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
58. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
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Amendment to the United States Constitution." Addressing this
problem in North Carolina leads to an investigation of the state's
power to preserve or alter inactive railroad corridors to serve any
purpose without compensating underlying fee owners or holders of
reversionary property interests. Where rights of way exist only in
easement, the "public highway" doctrine may prove invaluable to
preservation efforts in North Carolina such as the one underway on
the Wallace-Castle Hayne corridor. 6' The following discussion
addresses these and related issues in more depth to illuminate the
pitfalls and subtleties hidden in this somewhat confusing area of the
law.
II. INTERACTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW:
ABANDONMENT AND PRESERVATION
A. Background
To understand the legal issues associated with rail corridor
preservation efforts, one must first appreciate the interrelationship
between state and federal laws governing right of way abandonment
and preservation. Until recently, the Interstate Commerce
Commission (the "ICC") was the federal agency responsible for
overseeing most railroad abandonments.61 In 1996, Congress shifted
this duty to the newly created Surface Transportation Board (the
"STB") within the United States Department of Transportation. 2
The transfer of responsibilities generally did not affect a substantive
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; infra notes 98-110 and accompanying text (discussing a
recent Takings Clause challenge to a federal interim use statute).
60. See infra notes 226-346 and accompanying text (discussing the destructibility of
reversionary interests and the "public highway" doctrine).
61. Congress established the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") in 1887 as
the first federal attempt to regulate railroads, focusing specifically on rate structures and
rate discrimination. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (repealed
1967); ARI HOOGENBOOM & OLIVE HOOGENBOoM, A HISTORY OF THE ICC: FROM
PANACEA TO PALLiATIvE 13-18 (1976) (discussing the Progressive Movement's tendency
to instill a negative public attitude towards railroads, which led to the creation of the ICC).
The power of the ICC increased with time, and by 1920, jurisdiction over the establishment
and abandonment of rail routes shifted from state chartering mechanisms to the ICC. See
KEELER, supra note 4, at 24-25; see also CONANT, supra note 2, at 113-31 (providing a
history of the ICC's regulation of abandonments between 1946 and 1962). See generally
KEELER, supra note 4, at 19-42 (sketching the history of railroad regulation in the United
States).
62. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 102(a), 109 Stat. 803, 804-
52 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11901 (Supp. I 1995)); id. § 201(a), 109
Stat. at 932-40 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 701-706,721-727 (Supp. 11995)).
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change in the federal regulation of railroads.6 In particular, the STB
has retained its predecessor's authority over railroad right-of-way
abandonments and interim use statutes.Y
B. Regulation ofAbandonments
Although state law determines when a common law property
abandonment has occurred, a right of way will not come under a
state's legislative or judicial jurisdiction until the STB approves a
regulatory abandonment request6 The STB maintains exclusive and
plenary regulatory authority over railroads, which preempts local
and state control over most railroad corridors." Except for some
spurs, sidetracks, and railyards, a railroad may not abandon a
corridor without prior authorization from the STB. 67 The procedures
to be followed to acquire an abandonment order are contained in 49
U.S.C. §§ 10903 to 10907.6
Confusion often arises among courts and commentators
addressing rail corridor abandonments because a railroad may
obtain a regulatory abandonment order, but have no accompanying
intention to relinquish its property interest in a right of way.'
63. See 49 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (shifting functions of ICC to STB).
64. See id. 3 10903-10906. See generally CONANT, supra note 2, at 119-31 (providing
background information on ICC's regulatory authority over abandonments).
65. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 8 (1990) ("State law generally governs the
disposition of reversionary interests, subject of course to the ICC's 'exclusive and plenary'
jurisdiction to regulate abandonments and to impose conditions affecting
postabandonment use of the property." (citations omitted)); Wild, supra note 2, at 2;
Phillips, supra note 1, at 926-27; Roger M. Stahl, Comment, Smoke Along the Tracks: The
Constitutionality of Converting Rails-To-Trails Under 16 U.S.C §1247(d), 16 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 861, 885 n.135 (1990) (citing the court of appeals decision in Preseault
v. ICC, 853 F.2d 145,147 (2d Cir. 1988), affid, 494 U.S. 1 (1990)).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (giving supremacy to federal law); Montange, supra
note 3, at 141.
67. See 49 U.S.C. § 10907; Montange, supra note 3, at 140-41.
68. See 49 U.S.C. 33 10903-10906.
69. For example, to ensure that it is relieved of all liabilities associated with an
unnecessary right of way, a railroad will often acquire an abandonment certificate when it
sells a corridor to a public agency or private organization, whether the corridor was held in
fee simple or easement. Telephone Interview with Mark B. Sullivan, Planning Section
Chief, Rail Division, NCDOT (May 5, 1997) (on file with author). If a sale does not
materialize, the railroad will maintain the corridor's integrity for future sale or use by
simply refusing to exercise its regulatory abandonment privileges under the certificate.
See id. Aside from corridor abandonment under § 10903(a)(1), a railroad may obtain a
certificate from the STB for the discontinuance of service over a right of way under
§ 10903(a)(2). See 49 U.S.C. § 10903(a). The procedure for obtaining a discontinuance
order is the same as that for securing an abandonment certificate. See id. 3H 10903-10905.
By requesting permission only to discontinue service, however, a railroad implicitly
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Similarly, while an abandonment certificate suggests an intent to
abandon,7 it may not trigger corridor dissolution under a state's
statutory and common law rules for abandonment.71 For instance,
North Carolina General Statutes § 1-44.1 presumes abandonment of
railroad easements seven years after the removal of tracks and other
structures from a right of way if the railroad does not utilize the
corridor for railroad purposes during that time. 72 Because the STB's
exclusive authority over rights of way preempts § 1-44.1 until an
abandonment order is issued by the STB, expiration of the state's
seven-year statute of limitations can have no effect on a right of way
until the federal agency acts.73 Thus, an abandonment at common
law may not necessarily coincide with regulatory abandonment. 74
manifests an intent to preserve the underlying right of way for future use should economic
conditions warrant reactivation of service over the line. See generally CONANT, supra note
2, at 132-65 (discussing the regulatory controls over the discontinuance of rail services).
Unfortunately, this distinguishing characteristic of discontinuance of service orders may be
easily overlooked despite its significant import in common law abandonment
determinations, which rely heavily on the apparent intent of railroads to preserve or
abandon corridors. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text (outlining the law of
abandonment in North Carolina); see, e.g., J. A. Connelly, Annotation, What Constitutes
Abandonment of a Railroad Right of Way, 95 A.L.R.2d 468,470 (1964) ("An application to
the appropriate governmental agency regulating railroads for permission to discontinue
service has ... been considered as a factor indicating an intention to abandon...
70. See Connelly, supra note 69, at 470.
71. See Lacy v. East Broad Top R.R. & Coal Co., 77 A.2d 706, 710 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1951) (holding that the removal of tracks and the acquisition of an abandonment
certificate from a regulatory board do not constitute abandonment); 74 CJ.S. Railroads
§ 117, at 542 (1951) (stating that abandonment occurs only if external acts show the intent
to abandon was carried out, and that mere nonuse does not, of itself, establish
abandonment); Montange, supra note 3, at 152-53, 162-63. But see Stahl, supra note 65, at
886 n.136 (noting that the need for 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), which preserves rights of way for
use as nature trails, arose because some states provided for the automatic termination of
railroad easements on the discontinuance of service); see also Connelly, supra note 69, at
470 (suggesting that non-use coupled with an application to a regulatory agency may
trigger an abandonment); see, e.g., Fritsch v. ICC, 59 F.3d 248, 252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1262 (1996) (finding, based on the actions and letters of the railroad
evidencing abandonment, that the easement terminated at the expiration of the 180-day
waiting period prescribed by 49 U.S.C. § 10906 (now recodified as § 10905)).
72. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-44.1 (1996); infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text
(quoting and discussing § 1-44.1).
73. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text (discussing generally the law of
abandonment in North Carolina). Note also that upon abandonment, state law will control
the disposition of any property interests in an abolished right of way. See Preseault v. ICC,
494 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1990) (noting that the disposition of reversionary interests is controlled by
state property law).
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C. Preservation Legislation
Legislation concerning rail corridor preservation exists at both
the federal and state levels. Most commentaries addressing
alternative uses of corridors have focused on the constitutionality of
federal efforts to protect rights of way for future public use under 16
U.S.C. § 1247(d)." In § 1247(d), however, Congress also has
explicitly encouraged states to formulate their own corridor
preservation initiatives.76 Before examining such efforts in North
Carolina, one must first understand the basic operation of
§ 1247(d).7
Under § 1247(d), the STB is directed to authorize states,
municipalities, and private organizations to convert inactive
corridors threatened by abandonment to interim recreational trail
uses until such time as the right of way is again needed for railroad
purposes ("railbanking"). 78  The government agency or group may
acquire the corridor outright or simply assume managerial, financial,
and tort liability for the right of way without taking title to it.7"
Section 1247(d) provides that interim uses "shall not be treated, for
purposes of any law or rule of law, as an abandonment of the use of
75. See National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983 § 208, Pub. L No. 98-11, 97
Stat. 43 (1983) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1994)); Richard Henick, Rails-to-Trails:
Everyone Benefits, Don't They?, 10 TEMP. ENvTL. L & TECH. J. 75, 81-90 (1991); Wild,
supra note 2, at 2; Phillips, supra note 1, at 908-26; Stahl, supra note 65, at 868-96.
Congress also has provided for corridor preservation in the STB's regulatory authority
concerning right of way abandonments. Under 49 U.S.C. § 10905 (formerly § 10906), the
STB may determine that a corridor under consideration for abandonment is suitable for
public purposes other than railroad use. See 49 U.S.C. § 10905 (Supp. 1 1995); KELER,
supra note 4, at 33-36 (discussing the major features of § 10905's predecessor statute (49
U.S.C. § 10906)). Upon making such a finding, the STB may delay issuing an
abandonment order for 180 days to allow any interested government or private entity a
right of first refusal in purchasing the right of way from the railroad. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 10905. The STB cannot, however, require a railroad to convey abandoned properties for
future public use. See Connecticut Trust for I-Estoric Preservation v. ICC, 841 F.2d 479,
483 (2d Cir. 1988). The failure of the ICC in the past to require the submission of these
properties for sale at reasonable rates, however, has handicapped the purchasing power of
interested groups unable to meet the sometimes exorbitant offers to sell tendered by the
railroads. See Montange, supra note 3, at 151.
76. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d).
77. Section 1247(d), enacted as section 208 of the National Trails System Act
Amendments of 1983, Pub. L No. 98-11, 97 Stat. 43 (1983), amended section 8(d) of the
National Trails System Act of 1968, Pub. L No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (1968) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251), which formulated a program at the federal level to
establish outdoor trails throughout the country. See Henick, supra note 75, at 78-79
(providing general background to § 1247(d)).
78. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); Henick, supra note 75, at 79.
79. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); Henick, supra note 75, at 79.
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such rights-of-way for railroad purposes."" By retaining the STB's
jurisdiction over corridors, § 1247(d) prevents inactive rights of way
from terminating under state statutory and common law rules of
abandonment.8 Parties attempting to railbank a right of way must
negotiate a satisfactory agreement with owner-railroads within 180
days of the STB granting an interim trail use order.' The success of
establishing interim uses under § 1247(d) depends largely upon
railroads' consent to interim use agreements, a willingness which
may not always be forthcoming. '
In response to this federal initiative, the North Carolina General
Assembly has enacted a series of statutes to foster the preservation
of railroad rights of way in the state." The NCDOT may assume
§ 1247(d) responsibility of railroad rights of way for "compatible
interim uses" by virtue of North Carolina General Statutes § 136-
44.36A." Also, North Carolina General Statutes § 136-44.36B
authorizes the NCDOT to acquire new or inactive corridors by
purchase, donation, or condemnation.' Under § 136-44.36D, private
groups may lease rights of way held by the department in fee simple
for "interim public recreation use" provided that the organization
satisfies certain conditions designed to ensure local public
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d).
81. See id. One of the motivations underlying § 1247(d) arose because some states
provided for the automatic termination of railroad easements upon discontinuance of
service over the right of way. See Montange, supra note 3, at 152-54; Stahl, supra note 65,
at 886 n.136; see also, e.g., Fritsch v. ICC, 59 F.3d 248,253 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding, based
on the actions and letters of the railroad, that the easement terminated at the expiration of
the 180-day waiting period prescribed by § 10906), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1262 (1996).
82. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(c)(1), (d)(1) (1996); Montange, supra note 3, at 154-55.
83. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); Morgan, supra note 8, at 17.
84. See Morgan, supra note 8, at 17.
85. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 136-44.36A to -44.36D (1993); see also id. § 136-44.35
(stating that railroad corridor preservation "serve[s] the public purpose"); 1993 AND
BEYOND, supra note 1, at 22 (outlining the importance of preserving unused corridors for
future transportation use); N.C. RAIL TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE GovERNoR's RAIL
TASK FORCETO GOVERNORJAMES G. MARTIN 22 (1993) (recommending the acquisition
and preservation of inactive railroad corridors).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-44.36A. This section reads: "The North Carolina
Department of Transportation is authorized, pursuant to 16 U.S.C.A. § 1247(d), to
preserve rail transportation corridors and permit compatible interim uses of such
corridors." Id.
87. See id. § 136-44.36B. Section 136-44.36B, however, specifically prohibits the
NCDOT from condemning "existing, active railroad line[s]." Id. In this respect, § 136-
44.36B is similar to § 1247(d) in that the department must secure the consent of a railroad
even if it intends to acquire the property outright from the corporation. See supra notes
82-84 and accompanying text.
2006 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75
participation in the conversion process.' Section 136-44.36D makes
no provision, however, for the establishment of interim uses on
easements acquired by the department,89 even though the state may
have the power to do so under the "public highway" doctrine. t'
Since many railroads acquired a hodgepodge of interests in single
corridors,' the legislature's failure to include such a provision may
impede efforts to establish cost-effective interim uses requiring
contiguous, uninterrupted corridors.'
The national Rails-to-Trails Conservancy and local affiliations
advocate the best-known and most controversial proposed interim
uses for idle rights of way. 3 These groups try to acquire inactive
corridors on which to establish temporary or permanent recreational
trails.' Depending on local sentiments and political leanings, the
efforts of rails-to-trails organizations have produced mixed results
around the country.' In North Carolina, proposals to convert
unused corridors into temporary recreational trails have sparked
controversy among adjacent landowners who oppose the prospect of
88. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-44.36D. One requirement is that the group must
secure a local government as a sponsor of the project. See id. § 136-44.36D(2). The local
government also must hold a public hearing on the proposed recreational use, notifying all
adjacent landowners by first-class mail. See id. § 136-44.36D (1).
89. See id. § 136-44.36D.
90. See infia notes 318-46 and accompanying text (discussing the North Carolina
"public highway" doctrine).
91. See Montange, supra note 3, at 152; infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text
(discussing types of interests acquired by railroads).
92. If a corridor traverses costly urban land and the NCDOT owns one parcel in less
than fee simple interest, the cost of completing the corridor by acquiring the requisite
interest under § 136-44.36D by condemnation or otherwise may prove too extraordinary to
justify for interim use purposes. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing
high costs of acquiring new corridors in urban areas).
93. The non-profit Rails-to-Trails Conservancy boasts a membership of 70,000 and has
helped convert nearly 8000 miles of abandoned corridors into more than 800 rail-trails in
48 states. See Cobum, supra note 13, at 43.
94. See id. at 43-44.
95. See i. See generally Beverly Brown, From Rail to Trail, NEws AND OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 18, 1994, at 26 (discussing a successful trail in Carrboro-Chapel Hill,
North Carolina, and discussing other proposed trails for North Carolina); Mark Alan
Hudson, Rails to Trails: A Ribbon of a Hiking Path Winds Through Southwestern Virginia,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 18, 1993, at F12 (discussing the New River trail in
Virginia); Tun Means, Rails, Trails Compact Killed, PriT. POST-GAZETrE, Oct. 17, 1996,
at El (revealing the effect that local politics can have on rail-to-trail proposals); James Eli
Shiffer, Enthusiasts Push Dream of American Tobacco Trail, NEWS AND OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 26, 1996, at B1 (reporting on the anticipated ground-breaking of a
trail in Durham, North Carolina); Tim Simmons, Trail Groups Join Forces, NEWS AND
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 9, 1997, at Bl (discussing efforts in Raleigh-Durham,
North Carolina, to garner support for more recreational trails in the region).
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pedestrian and biking trails traversing their backyards 6 Generally,
landowners have begun questioning the constitutionality of allowing
these types of interim uses on former railroad rights of wayY
D. Interaction of State and Federal Law
Preseault v. ICC is an illustrative case demonstrating the
interaction of state and federal jurisdiction over corridor
abandonment and preservation. Preseault reached the United States
Supreme Court in 1990Y The case began when the claimants
initiated a quiet-title action in state court for an inactive easement
abutting their property, arguing that the corridor had been
abandoned by the railroad."' Because the ICC had not issued an
abandonment order for the right of way, the trial court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court of Vermont
affirmed. 1' The landowners then petitioned the ICC for an
abandonment certificate to perfect their claim.0 2 The ICC refused to
grant the request when the State of Vermont intervened and asked
that the right of way be transferred to the City of Burlington for
interim use as a trail under 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d)."l The ICC honored
96. For example, a rail-to-trail conversion proposed in Stokes County, North Carolina,
between Rural Hall and Brook Cove met with heavy resistance from local residents and
was ultimately defeated by the county commissioners in November 1995. See Citizens
Oppose Proposed Public Trail, DANBURY REPORTER, Oct. 5,1995, at 1; G.I. Wooding III,
Stokes Commissioners Nix Rail-Trail, WEEKLY INDEP. (Rural Hall, N.C.), Nov. 9,1995, at
1; G.I. Wooding m, Give Rail-Trail Idea a Chance, Backer Says, WEEKLY INDEP. (Rural
Hall, N.C.), Nov. 2,1995, at 1; G.. Wooding m, Neighbors Organize to Oppose Rail-Trail,
WEEKLY INDEP, (Rural Hall, N.C.), Sept. 28, 1995, at 1; see also Joe Marusak, Lincoln
Landowners Want Land Back; Vow To Fight Bikeways and Trails, GASTON OBSERVER
(Gastonia, N.C.), Sept. 1, 1989, at A3 (citing opposition in Lincointon, North Carolina to
proposed trail uses on soon-to-be abandoned corridor).
97. See Coburn, supra note 13, at 43 (discussing the impact of the rails-to-trails
controversy on local governments' efforts to take advantage of the recreational and
natural development opportunities offered by inactive corridors). See generally Stuart
Leavenworth, State Landowners Challenging Laws: N.C. Follows "Property Rights" Trend,
NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 9, 1995, at Al (discussing the property rights
movement in North Carolina, particularly with respect to challenges to environmental
regulation).
98. 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
99. See id.
100. See id. at 9 ("Vermont Railway stopped using the route more than a decade ago
and has since removed all railroad equipment, including switches, bridges, and track, from
the portion of the right of way claimed by petitioners.").
101. See Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont v. State, 496 A.2d 151, 154 (Vt. 1985),
aff'd sub nom. Presault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
102. See Preseault, 494 U.S. at 9.
103. See id.
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the state's petition and refused the claimants a rehearing.1" On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected the claimants' contentions that the ICC's action violated the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution"' and extended beyond the reach of Congress's
Commerce Clause Power under Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the
Constitution. 6 The Supreme Court affirmed, refusing to find a valid
takings claim because the petitioners had not exhausted all of the
remedies available to them under federal laws dealing with takings
claims against the federal government." The Court also rejected the
claimants' Commerce Clause argument based on a "traditional
rationality standard of review" of Congress's regulatory authority
over railroad easements.1' 8
Preseault did not determine whether § 1247(d) requires the
federal government to provide compensation to fee owners
underlying railroad easements dedicated to nonrailroad purposes.'"
As Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Preseault emphasized,
however, state law will play an important role in the Court's
determination as to which property interests will warrant protection
under the Fifth Amendment."' Thus, clarifying state statutory and
common law principles in this area not only benefits litigators at the
federal level, but also helps legislators to fashion responsible and
104. See id.
105. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
106. See id. art. I, § 8, cd. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... (3) [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."); Preseault v. ICC, 853 F.2d 145, 149, 150-51 (2d Cir. 1988), affid, 494 U.S. 1
(1990).
107. See Preseauh, 494 U.S. at 17. Specifically, the claimants failed to seek redress
under the Tucker Act. See id. at 11-17. The Tucker Act provides claimants an initial
forum in United States Claims Court to determine damages for disputes brought against
the federal government based on constitutional, statutory, regulatory, or contractual
grounds. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994); Henick, supra note 75, at 89-90 (discussing the
Tucker Act with regard to Preseauh). By holding that the landowners' claim had not
ripened in Preseault, the Court avoided the question of whether § 1247(d) affected a taking
requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment. See Preseaulh, 494 U.S. at 17.
108. Preseauh, 494 U.S. at 17; Wild, supra note 2, at 2; Phillips, supra note 1, at 927
(discussing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Preseault); Stahl, supra note 65, at 885-96
(discussing Preseauh generally). For the disposition of the Preseaults' subsequent Tucker
Act claim, see Preseault v. ICC, 100 F.3d 1525 (2d Cir. 1996).
109. See Preseauh, 494 U.S. at 17.
110. See itU at 20 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion, but write
separately to express my view that state law determines what property interest petitioners
possess .... ).
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effective corridor preservation statutes that would withstand
constitutional attacks such as those brought against § 1247(d). Such
initiatives might better address local concerns and would also lessen
the need for states to rely on federal legislation.
IV. ACQUIRING RAILROAD RIGHTS OF WAY
A. Corporate Powers and Statutory Authority
Untangling the web of property interests acquired by railroad
corporations over the past century and a half in North Carolina
requires a brief historical overview of corporate formation in the
state. During the nineteenth century the state legislature chartered
many corporations by special legislative acts.111 These acts outlined
in detail corporate rights, duties, and powers."' The increasing
economic activity spawned by the industrial revolution eventually
rendered this method of incorporation too cumbersome and time-
consuming.to continue." A limited constitutional prohibition on
private acts of incorporation first appeared in 18684 and was
amended in 1917 to forbid most special acts of incorporation."
111. See ORTH, supra note 31, at 142; RUSSELL M. ROBINSON, II, ROBINSON ON
NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW § 1-1, at 1 (5th ed. 1995); see also HARRY G.
HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss
ENTERPRISES § 12, at 26 (3d ed. 1983) (providing general history of development of
American corporation law).
112. See, e.g., An Act to Incorporate the Wilmington & Raleigh Rail Road Company,
Priv. L, ch. 78 (1833) (providing in detail the various aspects of the railroad's corporate
existence).
113. See ORTH, supra note 31, at 142. Incorporation by private legislative act also
proved susceptible to political bribery and corruption, further expediting its eventual
demise. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 111, § 12, at 25; ORTH, supra note 31, at
142; ROBINSON, supra note 111, § 1-1, at 1-2.
114. See N.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1868); HENN &ALEXANDER, supra note 111, § 12,
at 25; ORTH, supra note 31, at 142; ROBINSON, supra note 111, § 1-1, at 2. The
qualification to this restriction, however, allowed the legislature to incorporate by special
act when, in its judgment, the purposes of the corporation could not be served by
incorporating under general statutes. See ROBINSON, supra note 111, § 1-1, at 2. The
legislature continued to charter railroads by special act after 1868. See, e.g., An Act to
Incorporate the Asheville and Tennessee Railroad Company, Priv. L, ch. 340 (1887). The
first general incorporation act for railroads appeared in 1872. See An Act to Authorize the
Formation of Railroad Companies and to Regulate the Same, Pub. L., ch. 138 (1872).
115. See N.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1917); ORTH, supra note 31, at 142; HENN &
ALEXANDER, supra note 111, § 12, at 25; ORTH, supra note 31, at 142; ROBINSON, supra
note 111, § 1-1. The 1917 amendment forbade incorporation by special act, except for
organizations serving charitable, educational, penal, or reformatory purposes. See N.C.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1917); HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 111, § 12, at 25; ORTH,
supra note 31, at 142; ROBINSON, supra note 111, § 1-1, at 2.
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Today, the North Carolina Business Corporation Act governs the
formation and dissolution of corporations in the state.11
Reflective of their quasi-public nature, 7 railroad corporations
are granted specific powers under North Carolina General Statutes
§ 62-220."s As creatures of the state, railroads may hold property
only pursuant to statutory authorization."9  While modem statutes
govern contemporary property acquisitions by railroads, many of the
existing rights of way in North Carolina were originally established
under private legislative charters of nineteenth century vintage.
12 1
Although superseded in many respects by corporate mergers and
subsequent legislation, these old charters still play a vital role in
determining the extent of property interests held by modern railroad
corporations."1
B. Interests Taken: Fee Simple, Qualified Fee, and Easements
Generally speaking, a railroad may take any property interest
authorized by statute."' Rights of way are usually held in fee simple
116. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1-01 to -17-05 (1990 & Supp. 1996); HENN &
ALEXANDER, supra note 111, § 12, at 25; ORTH, supra note 31, at 142; ROBINSON, supra
note 111, § 1-2 (providing a legislative history of the North Carolina Business Corporation
Act).
117. See infra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
118. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-220 (1989).
119. See N.C. State Highway Comm'n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 471, 189
S.E.2d 272, 279 (1972) (citing Wallace v. Moore, 178 N.C. 114, 115, 100 S.E. 237, 238
(1919)); 74 CJ.S. Railroads § 16, at 365 (1951); 1 REDFIELD, supra note 33, § 17, at 55-61.
Although a railroad cannot acquire property except as authorized by statute, such
authority may be implied to the extent reasonably necessary for the company to perform
its corporate functions. See 1 BYRON K ELuor & WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF RAILROADS §§ 451-452, at 686-87 (3d ed. 1921). A railroad may not
exercise any greater power than that granted by its charter, but if a general statute
conflicts with the charter, the statute will prevail. See 74 CJ.S. Railroads § 16, at 365. This
preemption occurs most often when a statute restricts a broad grant of authority to a
railroad in its articles of incorporation. See id at 365-66. The authority of the STB may
preempt regulatory provisions contained in either a general statute or a specific charter.
See KEELER, supra note 4, at 21 ("Unless overruled by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, these charters are still legally binding on the railroads."); supra notes 65-68
and accompanying text (discussing authority of the STB).
120. See CARRIKER, supra note 24.
121. This Comment will not directly examine the problems associated with construing
language in deeds and legislative charters to determine whether a railroad has acquired a
fee simple or lesser interest. For a discussion of deed construction, see generally City
Motel, Inc. v. State, 336 P.2d 375, 377-78 (Nev. 1959), and A. E. Korpela, Annotation,
Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Easement, 6 A.LR.3d 973 (1966). For a
specific construction of a legislative charter, see State v. Rives, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 297, 303-
05 (1844).
122. See Farm Equipment, 281 N.C. at 471, 189 S.E.2d at 279 (citing Wallace, 178 N.C.
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absolute ("fee simple"), qualified fee, or easement.ln' If held in fee
simple, the railroad may use the property as it pleases, the corridor
never being subject to abandonment. 24 As a more restrictive
interest, a qualified fee may be held only so long as the railroad
satisfies some stipulation identified at the time of acquisition." That
condition may be designated in the instrument conveying title to the
railroad.26 Such conditions most often require that the right of way
be used for railroad purposes-upon abandonment of such use, the
property will revert to the grantor or his successors in interest.w
Both types of fee interests are alienable, but qualified fee restrictions
remain attached to the property subsequent to any transfer."
at 115, 100 S.E. at 238); Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 251 N.C. 531,
533-35, 112 S.E.2d 111, 113-14 (1960); 2 ELLIOTr & ELLIOTT, supra note 119, §§ 1158,
1222. The types of interests that railroads may acquire have varied from state to state
over the last 150 years. See 1 REDFIELD, supra note 33, § 69, at 270-71.
123. See Swarthout, supra note 46, at 307. A railroad may generally hold either a fee
simple determinable or a fee simple subject to condition subsequent in its right of way. See
id (listing types of qualified estates). The technical distinctions between these contingent
estates affect primarily when and to whom the estate will vest upon reversion for condition
satisfied or broken. See id; 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 4-13; 28 AM. JUn. 2D Estates
§§ 28-29 (1966). Because this Comment will not directly address the disposition of
property interests upon abandonment of a right of way, the general term "qualified fee"
will be used to denote an estate held in less than fee simple, but greater than an easement
or a license. See generally Swarthout, supra note 46, at 296-324 (discussing disposition of
contingent interests upon abandonment of railroad rights of way).
124. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
125. See Swarthout, supra note 46, at 307.
126. See 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 4-13, at 71.
127. See Swarthout, supra note 46, at 297.
128. See McLaurin v. Winston-Salem Southbound Ry., 323 N.C. 609, 613, 374 S.E.2d
265, 268 (1988); State v. Rives, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 297, 304 (1844) (holding that the railroad
held condemned land in fee, but stating in dicta that "[a]n estate upon condition is not
necessarily exempted from sale by execution"); see also 1 REDFELD, supra note 33, § 69,
at 270 (citing Rives for the proposition that a railroad may hold a fee simple for purposes
of alienation, but only a determinable fee for purposes of enjoyment). The facts of State v.
Rives involved a debtor-creditor action. See Rives, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) at 302-03. The issue
presented concerned the creditor's right to execute a sale of condemned property for debt
unpaid. See id. Inasmuch as the issue was left unresolved by the ultimate holding in the
case, the holder of a reversionary interest in a qualified fee estate may still have an action
against a purchaser who fails to perform the necessary condition. See id. But the final
disposition of the property is of no consequence to the creditor who desires only to be paid.
See id. But cf. Barcello v. Hapgood, 118 N.C. 712, 730, 24 S.E. 124, 126-27 (1896) (noting
that the right of public or quasi-public corporations to alienate property is not unqualified
because of the duty such corporations owe to the public). As for the alienability of
property held in fee simple, only the state may challenge such transfers based on the
doctrine of ultra vires, which provides that an action may be void as beyond the power
granted by the state: "[R]ailroads have been recognized as having the power to sell land
held in fee, even if it is for a non-railroad purpose. Furthermore, even if a particular
action of a railroad in disposing of such property were ultra vires, only the State would
have standing to object." Love v. United States, 889 F. Supp. 1548, 1580 (E.D.N.C. 1994)
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Property held in easement by a railroad is considered to be
commercial in nature and therefore is alienable."z Since an easement
gives the railroad only a right to use the property and is a
nonpossessory interest,"0 the underlying fee owner may use the right
of way "for purposes not inconsistent with its use for railroad
purposes."' 1 Upon abandonment of the railroad use, the easement
terminates, and the servient estate is freed from any encumbrances."
As with rights of way held in qualified fee, the restrictive language
conditioning the existence of the easement may be contained in the
conveying instrument and may be more or less qualifying, depending
on the specific words of limitation. 3
C. Effect of Acquisition Method on Interest Taken
Railroads may acquire property interests by voluntary grant or
agreement, purchase, or condemnation.' Exercise of each of these
methods must be authorized by statute."5 In the case of eminent
domain, the statute under which the condemnation proceedings were
(citation omitted).
129. See RESTATEMENT OFPROPERTY § 491 cmt. b (1936); 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37,
§ 15-1. Note, however, that any conditions attached to the easement will remain in place
after the transfer. See McKinley v. Waterloo R.R., 368 N.W.2d 131,134 (Iowa 1985).
130. See I WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-1.
131. N.C. State Highway Comm'n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 472, 189 S.E.2d
272, 280 (1972); see also infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text (addressing the scope
of railroad easements).
132. See I WEBsTER, supra note 37, § 15-29.
133. See Swaim v. Simpson, 120 N.C. App. 863,864,463 S.E.2d 785,786-87 (1995), affd
mem., 343 N.C. 298,469 S.E.2d 553 (1996); 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-21 (discussing
judicial methods for determining the scope of easements).
134. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-220(2), (3), (4) (1989); see also 74 C.J.S. Railroads
§ 75, at 453 (1951) (discussing methods by which railroad corporations may acquire
property). Railroads may also take land by adverse possession or prescription, but only an
easement may be acquired by these means. See 74 CJ.S. Railroads § 75, at 454; 1 ELLIOTr
& ELuOTr, supra note 11, § 462, at 698-699. Unlike the situation at common law, a
railroad does not have to attempt first to acquire property by gift or purchase before
initiating condemnation proceedings. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-4 (1984) (providing that
no prior offer to purchase is required); 2 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 19-5; cf. Parker, supra
note 31, at 297-98 (explaining the old common law requirement that the landowner first be
given the opportunity to sell her property voluntarily). When a railroad builds its right of
way in the absence of an express grant, sale, or condemnation proceeding, the landowner's
acquiescence may ripen title in the corporation if he fails to seek compensation within any
applicable statutory or charter limitations. See Barker v. Southern Ry., 137 N.C. 214, 222-
23, 49 S.E. 115,118 (1904); Parker, supra note 31, at 309-10, 313.
135. See N.C. State Highway Comm'n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 471, 189
S.E.2d 272, 279 (1972) (citing Wallace v. Moore, 178 N.C. 114, 115, 100 S.E. 237, 238
(1919)); 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 75, at 453; Parker, supra note 31, at 297.
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administered controls the type of interest acquired. 6 The language
of the enabling legislation usually specifies the interest obtainable by
each method, and where ambiguity exists, the courts must step in to
interpret the statutory language." 7 The modem statutory provisions
authorizing railroads to acquire property are contained in North
Carolina General Statutes § 62-220." The provisions contained in
Chapter 40A of the General Statutes focus specifically on the
procedures to be followed in condemnation actions."9
Section 62-220(3) states that "real estate received by voluntary
grant shall be held and used for the purposes of such grant only."'4
This language implies that a railroad may not acquire a fee simple
interest in land obtained by voluntary grant.'" Imposing such a
restriction is clearly within the discretion of the General Assembly.'
136. See 2 ELLIOTT & ELU7Or, supra note 11, § 1222, at 760 (noting that "[a] railroad
can not condemn a less interest in land taken than that required and prescribed by the
legislature"); 2 WEBSTEP, supra note 37, §§ 19-1, -4; Parker, supra note 31, at 298;
Swarthout, supra note 46, at 320;.
137. See 1 REDFIBLD, supra note 33, § 64, at 253 (concluding that any doubts of power
of eminent domain should be resolved against the exercise of such power); 2 WEBSTER,
supra note 37, § 19-1, at 804 ("Statutes which authorize the exercise of the power of
eminent domain must be strictly construed.").
138. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-220 (1989).
139. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 40A-1 to -13 (1984) (containing general provisions for the
exercise of eminent domain); id §§ 40A-19 to -34 (pertaining specifically to private
condemnors); id. §§ 40A-62 to -69 (addressing compensation issues in condemnation
proceedings); see also 2 WEBsTER, supra note 37, §§ 19-5, -10 (elaborating on
condemnation proceedings in North Carolina); Parker, supra note 31, passim (discussing
the law of eminent domain in North Carolina).
140. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-220(3) (emphasis added).
141. See N.C. State Highway Comm'n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 472, 189
S.E.2d 272,279 (1972). Any restrictions on an interest acquired under § 62-220(3) should
be defined in the grant itself. See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text. In the
absence of express conditions in the grant, it is unclear what interest a railroad could take
under Farm Equipment as the court did not elaborate upon the point. See Farm
Equipment, 281 N.C. at 472,189 S.E.2d at 279.
142. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. Such a restrictive approach is not
foreign to railroad law. In fact, it comports with one popular view that a railroad's right to
acquire lands is implicitly, if not expressly, limited to the necessities of the railroad and
may never be used for private purposes unless the grantor consents. See 2 ELLIOTr &
ELLIOTr, supra note 11, § 1158, at 627-29; 1 REDFELD, supra note 33, § 61, at 234 & n.4.
The Nevada Supreme Court applied this doctrine in City Motel, Inc. v. State, 336 P.2d 375
(Nev. 1959):
A railroad ordinarily does not hold in fee the land over which its right of way is
constructed and maintained but merely an easement for such right of way
whether such land is acquired by eminent domain or otherwise; that it might hold
more than an easement is never presumed.
Id. at 377. But see McCotter v. Barnes, 247 N.C. 480, 486-88, 101 S.E.2d 330, 335-36
(1958) (casting as non-binding dictum the doctrine announced in Shepard v. Suffolk &
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Section "62-220(4) allows a railroad "[t]o purchase, hold and use all
such real estate and other property as may be necessary for the
construction and maintenance of its railroad, the stations and other
accommodations necessary to accomplish the object of its
incorporation."'43  In N.C. State Highway Commission v. Farm
Equipment Co., the North Carolina Supreme Court construed § 62-
220 as allowing railroads to hold property in fee if acquired by
purchase under § 62-220(4)." When a railroad exercises its power of
eminent domain under § 62-220(2),'" however, it may acquire only
an easement for railroad purposes, extinguishable should the
railroad abandon the use.1" This rule prevents the involuntary
taking of private land for other than public purposes, which would
be inimical to the principle that condemnation must only serve public
ends.'47 The historical antecedent of this rule can be traced to Blue v.
Aberdeen & West End Railroad.'"
Carolina R.R., 140 N.C. 391, 393, 53 S.E. 137, 138 (1901), that railroads can acquire rights
of way only in easement).
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-220(4).
144. See Farm Equipment, 281 N.C. at 472, 189 S.E.2d at 279.
145. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-220(2) ("To Condemn Land under Eminent
Domain.-To appropriate land and rights therein by condemnation, as provided in the
Chapter Eminent Domain.").
146. See Farm Equipment, 281 N.C. at 472, 189 S.E.2d at 280; see also 1 WEBSTER,
supra note 37, § 15-18 (noting that only an easement passes to a railroad condemning for
right of way).
147. See Farm Equipment, 281 N.C. at 472, 189 S.E.2d at 280; Shields v. Norfolk &
Carolina R.R., 129 N.C. 1, 7,39 S.E. 582,584 (1901); 2 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 19-1(a);
Parker, supra note 31, at 302; see also 1 REDFIELD, supra note 33, § 69, at 264 (stating that
a railroad may take only an easement by condemnation, just as condemnation for roads
and highways may be similarly limited). Although the judiciary will defer to the
legislature in most cases as to what constitutes a "public purpose," the issue ultimately is
one of law for the courts to decide. See 2 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 19-1(a); see also
Raleigh & Gaston R.R. v. Davis, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 451, 469-70 (1837) (equating a
railroad purpose with a public purpose).
148. 117 N.C. 644, 23 S.E. 275 (1895). The court in Blue held:
The right of way of railway companies is, by judgment of condemnation made
subject to occupation where and only where the corporation finds it necessary to
take actual possession in furtherance of the ends for which the company was
created. The damages are not assessed upon the idea of a proposed actual
dominion, occupation, and perception of the profits of the whole right of way by
the corporation; but the calculation is based upon the principle that possession
and exclusive control will be asserted only over so much of the condemned
territory as may be necessary for corporate purposes ....
Id. at 649, 23 S.E. at 276-77. Two years later in Beach v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad,
120 N.C. 498, 26 S.E. 703 (1897), the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted Blue to
conclude that a railroad could acquire only an easement by condemnation. See Beach, 120
N.C. at 503, 26 S.E. at 704. A series of subsequent cases at the turn of the century
affirmed the holdings in Blue and Beach. See Shields, 129 N.C. at 4-5, 39 S.E. at 583; Geer
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The precedent established in Blue was codified in chapter 61,
§§ 2566 and 2587 of North Carolina's Revised Statutes of 1905."49
Section 2566 applied the provisions of chapter 61 "not inconsistent
with their charters" to all existing railroad corporations."5 Section
2587 stated that "all persons who have been made parties to the
[condemnation] proceedings shall be divested and barred of all right,
estate and interest in such easement in such real estate during the
corporate existence of the company aforesaid."'' This was not the
first general statute addressing the powers of railroad corporations.
In 1872, the General Assembly passed a general act under which
railroads could incorporate, providing an alternative to the
traditional method of drafting special charters for consideration by
the legislature."5 The statute included modified versions of many of
the standard provisions found in earlier private charters." Most
importantly for present purposes, § 2587 of the 1905 Revisal
contained the same language as the 1872 act, except that the phrase
"in such easement" was absent from the 1872 version.1
4
Limiting railroads by allowing them to condemn only easements
may undermine the broader public transportation purposes that
railroad corridors could serve.'5 This criticism finds support in the
fact that many of the railroad and canal company charters written
throughout the nineteenth century in North Carolina authorized
v. Durham Water Co., 127 N.C. 349, 354, 37 S.E. 474, 476 (1900); Lassiter v. Norfolk &
Carolina R.R., 126 N.C. 509,512,36 S.E. 48, 49 (1900); Raleigh & Augusta Air-Line R.R.
v. Sturgeon, 120 N.C. 225,228-29,26 S.E. 779,780 (1897).
149. See Revisal of 1905 of North Carolina, ch. 61, § 2566 (1905); id. § 2587.
150. Id. § 2566 (1905). The North Carolina Supreme Court in 1919 noted that a charter
may control when chapter 61 conflicts with the charter provisions as prescribed specifically
in the exception to § 2566. See Wallace v. Moore, 178 N.C. 114, 116, 100 S.E. 237, 238
(1919).
151. Revisal of 1905 of North Carolina, ch. 61, § 2587 (emphasis added).
152. See An Act to Authorize the Formation of Railroad Companies and to Regulate
the Same, Pub. L, ch. 138 (1872).
153. Compare iU. §§ 13-16 (outlining the procedures to be used by railroads in
condemning property), with An Act to Incorporate the Raleigh and Gaston Rail Road
Company, Priv. L, ch. 25, §§ 12-16 (1835) (outlining the procedures to be used by the
Raleigh & Gaston Railroad in condemning property).
154. Compare An Act to Authorize the Formation of Railroad Companies and to
Regulate the Same, Pub. L, ch. 138, § 16 ("[A]IU persons who have been made parties to
the proceedings shall be divested and barred of all right, estate and interest in such real
estate during the corporate existence of the company as aforesaid."), with Revisal of 1905
of North Carolina, ch. 61, § 2587 ("[A]U persons who have been made parties to the
proceedings shall be divested and barred of all right, estate and interest in such easement
in such real estate during the corporate existence of the company aforesaid.").
155. See supra text accompanying note 8 (listing other transportation uses to which
railroad rights of way could be dedicated).
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these corporations to condemn land in fee.U Further, the absence of
restrictive language in the 1872 general incorporation act indicates
that even into the late nineteenth century, the legislature felt no need
to constrain the condemnation powers of railroads.' As reflected in
cases of the time, courts believed that railroad rights of way served
transportation needs that were subject to evolution and change.s
By establishing railroad corridors in perpetuity, the legislature
fostered economic and social growth throughout the state. 9 The
156. See An Act to Incorporate the Raleigh and Columbia Rail Road Company, Pub.
L, ch. 40, § 18 (1836) (providing that upon proper condemnation of land by the railroad,
title "shall be vested in the Raleigh and Columbia Rail Road Company, and they shall be
adjudged to hold the same in fee simple, in the same manner as if the proprietor had sold
and conveyed it to them"); An Act to Incorporate the Raleigh and Gaston Rail Road
Company, Priv. L, ch. 25, art. 16 (using the same language as the Raleigh and Columbia
charter); see also supra note 48 (discussing the construction of language in the Wilmington
& Weldon charter). For charters containing language similar to that in the Wilmington &
Weldon charter, see An Act to Incorporate the Greensville and Roanoke Rail Road
Company, Priv. L., ch. 74, art. 7 (1833), and An Act to Incorporate the Petersburg Rail
Road Company, Priv. L, ch. 56, art. 3 (1830). See also State v. Rives, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.)
297, 304 (1844) ("Most of the railroad charters in this State give an estate in the land in
fee."); Raleigh & Gaston R.R. v. Davis, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 452, 467 (1837) (noting
that the legislature can authorize the condemnation of a right of way in fee simple).
157. See An Act to Authorize the Formation of Railroad Companies and to Regulate
the Same, Pub. L, ch. 138, § 15.
158. See infra notes 282-84, 326-28 and accompanying text; see also 1 REDFIELD, supra
note 33, § 69, at 271 (explaining that some states allowed railroads to condemn rights of
way in fee simple).
159. See infra note 326 and accompanying text; see also BROWN, supra note 29, at 5-14
(discussing the poor economic conditions in North Carolina during the early 1800s, which
necessitated state-sponsored internal improvements, including the incorporation of canal
and railroad companies); CHARLES Kernan, Rails to Weeds: Searching OUT the Ghost
Railroads AROUND WILMINGTON 4 (1988); POWELL, supra note 24, at 288 (noting
Governor Morehead's recommendation in 1842 to the legislature that it should build a
network of railroads throughout the state to win North Carolina's economic independence
from its northern and southern neighbors). See generally KEE.ER, supra note 4, at 21
("American railroads received much aid in the form of land grants, and such grants, worth
considerable sums of money, were made throughout the country."). The most visible and
enduring commitment made by the state to railroad development occurred in 1849 when
the North Carolina Railroad was chartered. See CHARLES Kernan, Rails to Weeds:
Searching OUTrthe Ghost Railroads AROUND WILMINGTON 4 (1988); POWELL, supra note
24, at 288. The state subscribed to $2 million of the $3 million in capital necessary to build
the railroad from Charlotte to Goldsboro through Raleigh. See id. The state still owns
three-fourths of the stock in the North Carolina Railroad, which has leased its right of way
to a private railroad since 1895. See Steve Adams, North Carolina's Railroads: Which
Track for the Future?, NORTH CAROLINA INSIGHTS, June 1983, at 3, 3 (discussing the
history and possible future of the North Carolina Railroad). See generally ALLEN W.
TRELEASE, THE NORTH CAROLINA RAILROAD, 1849-1871 passim (1991) (providing a
comprehensive history of the formation and early years of the North Carolina Railroad);
Dudley Price, Ruling on NCRR Lease Could Prove Costly, NEWS AND OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 31, 1996, at Dl (providing background on the North Carolina
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disfavor into which railroads fell at the turn of the century may partly
explain the new-found reluctance among the courts and the
legislature to read into railroads' powers the ability to condemn in
fee simple.'O
By virtue of North Carolina General Statutes § 62-220 and
modem case law, a railroad today cannot acquire more than an
easement through condemnation, regardless of less restrictive
language in any predecessor corporation's original charter.161 If a
railroad acquired property prior to the formulation of the
contemporary rule in Blue v. Aberdeen & West End Railroad,62 the
charter should control the type of property interest acquired. Today,
therefore, the successor of such a railroad may hold property in fee
that was originally acquired by eminent domain. Presumably, a
modem court addressing an appropriate case would recognize the
validity of a fee simple title acquired in this way. Where a railroad
acquired a less than fee simple interest, however, the court may have
to delve into the law of abandonment to determine whether or not
the right of way still exists.
V. ABANDONMENT
A. Elements ofAbandonment
Over the years, courts have muddied the waters of railroad
abandonment law in North Carolina.6 The issue of abandonment
arises with regard only to railroad rights of way held in easement or
Railroad and its lease to the Norfolk Southern Corporation).
160. By the late 1800s, the railroad industry had fallen into ill repute for a variety of
reasons, especially among farmers, merchants, and industrialists. See HOOGENBOOM &
HOOGENBOOM, supra note 61, at 1-13, 39-46 (discussing how the Progressive Movement
encouraged a negative public attitude towards railroads); see also ALBRO MARTIN,
RAILROADS TRIrUMPHANT: THE GROWTH, REJECrION, AND REBIRTH OF A VITAL
AMERICAN FORCE 348-51 (1992) (discussing origins and effect of the Progressive Party on
regulation of railroads at the turn of the century); DAVID MOUNTFMLD, THE RAILWAY
BARONS 107-217 (1979) (providing a historical and biographical perspective on American
railroad monopolies and their negative public image); supra note 61 and accompanying
text (discussing the history of the ICC's regulation of railroads).
161. Thus, although the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad eventually became CSX
railroad over 100 years of corporate mergers and acquisitions, see supra note 36 and
accompanying text, CSX may condemn land only in easement pursuant to North Carolina
General Statutes § 62-220 and contemporary common law.
162. 117 N.C. 644, 649,23 S.E. 275,276-77 (1895).
163. Webster best captures the essence of this confusion: "Abandonment of an
easement serving as a right-of-way for a railroad can cause an academic headache." 1
WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-29, at 644.
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qualified fee.'" Corridors held in fee simple without qualification
cannot be abandoned, even if dedicated to a nonrailroad use."
Thus, a court may avoid the abandonment issue altogether by finding
that a railroad originally acquired a fee simple interest in the right of
way.'" When a determination of the matter cannot be avoided, the
court must conduct a fact-specific analysis, applying the state's
general law of abandonment to the circumstances of each particular
case. 67 If the facts satisfy the elements of abandonment, the right of
way will be extinguished and a court may have to decide who is
entitled to any reversionary or other interests attached to the former
railroad property)6
An abandonment may arise either by operation of state
common law or statute, 69 or through the activation of termination
clauses in individual property agreements between the railroad and
landowners.7  In North Carolina, an abandonment may be
presumed by statute after seven years, but where an agreement
provides for termination of an easement or a reversion of interest,
the instrument's terms should control the fate of the right of way.
164. See 74 CJ.S. Railroads § 117 (1951).
165. See id Even if a railroad acquired a fee simple interest in a corridor through
condemnation, the right of way may still be conveyed for nonrailroad purposes. See id.
166. When the issue of abandonment arises, the courts often comment on the matter
incompletely. See infra notes 205-23 and accompanying text (discussing the unclear case
law concerning the law of abandonment in North Carolina).
167. See infra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing the fact-specific analysis
used by the courts).
168. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 8 (1990) (holding that disposition of reversionary
interests is controlled by state property law); Pollnow v. State Dep't of Natural Resources,
276 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Wis. 1979) (noting the common law rule that easements extinguish
upon abandonment); Swarthout, supra note 46, at 307. Generally, reversionary interests
associated with a qualified fee will revert to the grantor or his successors in interest. See
infra notes 254-57 and accompanying text (discussing reversionary interests in general).
Addressing the disposition of interests upon abandonment of easements is beyond the
scope of this Comment. For a comprehensive treatment of both of these issues, see
generally Swarthout, supra note 46, passim. For a detailed and interesting account of the
disposition of reversionary interests in the context of federal land grants, see Sharon J.
Bell, Note, Osages, Iron Horses and Reversionary Interests: The Impact of United States v.
Atterbury on Railroad Abandonments, 20 TULSA LI. 255 (1984); see also Swarthout, supra
note 46, at 315 (discussing reversion of right of way interests acquired by federal land
grants). In North Carolina, General Statutes § 1-44.2 partially addresses this issue by
presuming ownership of abandoned railroad easements in adjacent property owners. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-44.2 (1996).
169. See Wild, supra note 2, at 11.
170. See Swarthout, supra note 46, at 298.
171. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-44.1 (1996).
172. See Swarthout, supra note 46, at 298; supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text
(discussing limitations on property acquired by railroads).
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In the absence of clear provisions in the original conveyance, a court
will have to intervene to construe the instrument. Similarly,
corridors acquired by condemnation in less than fee simple interest
will be controlled by limitations in the charter or statute under which
the eminent domain proceedings took place. 3 Again, ambiguity in
the legislative language will require a court to decide whether the
conditions of the enabling legislation have been breached.
The law of abandonment in North Carolina conforms generally
with the common law principles of other states.' The North
Carolina Supreme Court addressed the doctrine most precisely with
regard to railroads in Raleigh, Charlotte & Southern Railway v.
McGuire75 The court held that to prove that a right of way has been
abandoned, a claimant bears the burden7 6 of showing that (1) the
railroad harbored an intent to abandon; and (2) the railroad
manifested that intent through outward acts inconsistent with any
claim of title.'" The intention must exist concurrently with actual
relinquishment of the property, and the external acts must be
positive and unequivocal. 78 The facts must be strong and convincing
to establish abandonment.7 9 Because claimants can seldom prove an
intent to abandon, the outcome of most cases may necessarily
depend largely upon the railroad's outward acts with regard to the
right of way.8 No single factor, though, can conclusively establish
173. See supra notes 144 and accompanying text.
174. See generally 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-29 (discussing the general law of
abandonment in North Carolina); Connelly, supra note 69, at 470-99 (providing general
background on the law of abandonment in the railroad context).
175. 171 N.C. 277, 88 S.E. 337 (1916). In McGuire, the defendant landowner
constructed a fence across plaintiff railroad's right of way, claiming that the railroad had
permanently abandoned the right of way when it redirected its main line 300 or 400 feet
north of defendant's property to connect with a passenger station in Fuquay Springs. See
id. at 279-80, 88 S.E. at 338. Despite the relocation of its main line, the railroad continued
to use the original right of way as a spur track for handling cars and freight. See id. at 279,
88 S.E. at 338. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the relocation did not affect
an abandonment. See id. at 281-82, 88 S.E. at 339-40.
176. See id. at 281, 88 S.E. at 339; 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-29, at 644.
177. See McGuire, 171 N.C. at 281, 88 S.E. at 339; Allen v. Martin Marietta Corp., 26
N.C. App. 700,706,217 S.E.2d 112,116 (1975); 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-29, at 643;
see also 2 ELUOTr & ELLIOTr, supra note 11, § 1142, at 603 (stating that abandonment "is
largely a question of intent"); Connelly, supra note 69, at 470-99 (summarizing the law of
abandonment with regard to railroads).
178. See McGuire, 171 N.C. at 281, 88 S.E. at 339; 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-29,
at 643.
179. See 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 117, at 542 (1951).
180. See 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-29; Connelly, supra note 69, at 470.
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that an abandonment has occurred. 8" The question of abandonment
must be considered in light of the circumstances of individual cases."
Also, non-user or the mere lapse of time will not be enough to
constitute an abandonment without further acts suggesting an intent
to abandon."
B. Factors Suggesting Abandonment
1. General Considerations
Courts have identified a variety of factors evidencing an intent
to abandon." Especially important in North Carolina is the
statutory presumption of abandonment embodied in North Carolina
General Statutes § 1-44.1." If a railroad does not use a right of way
181. See Connelly, supra note 69, at 470.
182. See Carolina Tenn. Power Co. v. Hiawassee River Power Co., 175 N.C. 668, 680,
96 S.E. 99, 104 (1918); Faw v. Whittington, 72 N.C. 321, 324 (1875) (noting that the
definition of abandonment is a question of law, but the factual determination is to be made
by the jury); see also 2 ELLIOTr & ELLIoTr, supra note 11, § 1142, at 603 ("No general
rule of law, applicable to all gases, can be laid down as to what constitutes abandonment
... but the question whether abandonment exists in a given case must be determined by
the particular circumstances of that case."); 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-29, at 644
("m11he intention to abandon may be proved by an infinite variety of acts and is a question
for the jury to determine."); 74 CJ.S. Railroads § 117 (noting that the issue of
abandonment is generally a question of fact); Connelly, supra note 69, at 470 ("[Tjhe issue
in most cases is reduced to the question of what factors or circumstances are sufficient to
justify an inference that there existed an intent to abandon.").
183. See Carolina Tennessee Power Co., 175 N.C. at 680, 96 S.E. at 104; McGuire, 171
N.C. at 281, 88 S.E. at 339; 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-29; see also Faw, 72 N.C. at
324 ("The mere lapse of time or other delay in asserting his claim, unaccompanied by acts
inconsistent with his rights, will not amount to a waiver or abandonment."); 2 ELuOTT &
ELLIOT, supra note 11, § 1142, at 603 ("[M]ere nonuser does not of itself constitute an
abandonment where there is no intent to abandon."); 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 117 (discussing
the general law of abandonment); Connelly, supra note 69, at 470 (noting that "mere
nonuser is not sufficient to constitute abandonment of a right of way"). Non-user,
however, may constitute abandonment in some cases:
As a practical matter, however, this rule [that non-user does not cause
abandonment] has a somewhat limited application, since the evidence in most
cases is not confined to the mere fact of nonuser and it has been held that an
abandonment exists where the inference arising from proof of nonuser is
reinforced by various other circumstances.
Connelly, supra note 69, at 470.
184. See generally Connelly, supra note 69, at 470 (listing briefly general circumstances
suggesting an intent to abandon).
185. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-44.1 (1996). Section 1-44.1 reads:
Any railroad which has removed its tracks from a right-of-way and has not
replaced them in whole or in part within a period of seven (7) years after such
removal and which has not made any railroad use of any part of such right-of-way
after such removal of tracks for a period of seven (7) years after such removal,
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for railroad purposes for seven years after removing its tracks from
the corridor, § 1-44.1 imposes a statutory presumption that the right
of way has been abandoned. 6 The North Carolina Supreme Court,
however, has held that the statute applies only to rights of way held
in easement.' It is important to reiterate that the statute raises only
a presumption of abandonment, leaving open the possibility that a
railroad or assignee thereof may rebut the presumption with
evidence of an intent to preserve)8
Application to the STB for permission to abandon a corridor
may support a finding of an intent to abandon, but regulatory
abandonment alone should not trigger the dissolution of a right of
way." Other factors pertinent to a court's analysis of an
abandonment claim include the adverse possession by owners of
property adjacent to a right of way." ° Adverse possession in North
Carolina could not lead to any acquisition of title, but it might
suggest intent on the part of a railroad to relinquish control of the
corridor."1 Statements made by railroad officials indicating an intent
shall be presumed to have abandoned the railroad right-of-way.
Id.
186. See id.
187. See McLaurin v. Winston-Salem Southbound Ry., 323 N.C. 609, 612, 374 S.E.2d
265, 267 (1988). Whether § 1-44.1 applies also to rights of way held in qualified fee
remains unclear because no case has raised the issue and the McLaurin court did not
address the matter. See id. at 612-13, 374 S.E.2d at 267. Contemporary courts in North
Carolina tend to discuss railroad right of way property interests in terms of "fee" interests
and "easements," without distinguishing between fee simple absolute and lesser fee
estates. See id.; N.C. State Highway Comm'n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 472, 189
S.E.2d 272, 279-80 (1972). This ambiguity contributes to the uncertainty surrounding the
scope of § 1-44.1.
188. See McLaurin, 323 N.C. at 612,374 S.E.2d at 267.
189. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text; see also Lacy v. East Broad Top
R.R. & Coal Co., 77 A.2d 706, 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951) (holding that the removal of
tracks and the acquisition of an abandonment certificate from a regulatory board did not
give rise to abandonment); 74 CJ.S. Railroads § 117, at 542 (1951) (stating that
abandonment does not occur merely because of nonuse; actual abandonment is necessary);
Connelly, supra note 69, at 470. But see Stahl, supra note 65, at 886 n.136 (noting that the
need for 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) arose because some states provided for the automatic
termination of railroad easements on discontinuance of service); Connelly, supra note 69,
at 470 (suggesting that non-user coupled with an application to a regulatory agency may
trigger an abandonment); cf. Fritsch v. ICC, 59 F.3d 248, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding that,
based on the actions and letters of the railroad, the easement terminated at the expiration
of the 180-day waiting period prescribed by 49 U.S.C. § 10906), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1262 (1996).
190. See Connelly, supra note 69, at 470.
191. See id. Adverse possession may be of relatively little importance in North
Carolina due to the statutory treatment of the matter in North Carolina General Statutes
§ 1-44. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-44 (1996); supra note 45 (noting prohibition on adverse
possession of railroad rights of way in North Carolina). Also, the North Carolina Supreme
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to abandon will also support a claimant's argument."i Other acts by
a railroad, such as the acquisition or use of alternate routes " and the
use of rights of way for nonrailroad purposes, also might imply an
intent to abandon."
2. Lease or Sale of Right of Way
Courts generally have refused to find an abandonment when a
railroad leased or sold a right of way for uses not inconsistent with
railroad purposes.'" In a North Carolina case, Allen v. Martin
Marietta Corp.,96 a railroad leased a spur track to a private company
on condition that the lease would terminate if the railroad needed
the land for railroad use.' The lessee, a mining company, used the
Court has held that railroad easements may be utilized by underlying fee owners to such
an extent as the right of way is not needed for railroad purposes: "'A permissive use of a
right of way by another, when no present inconvenience results to the company, is not a
surrender of rights of property, and, indeed, to expel an occupant under such
circumstances would be a needless and uncalled for injury."' Raleigh, Charlotte & S. Ry.
v. McGuire, 171 N.C. 277, 282, 88 S.E. 337, 340 (1916) (quoting Carolina Cent. R.R. v.
McCaskill, 94 N.C. 746, 754 (1886)); see also Raleigh & Augusta Air Line R.R. v.
Sturgeon, 120 N.C. 225, 228-29, 26 S.E. 779, 780 (1897) (noting that adjacent landowners
may use rights of way to such an extent as not to interfere with their use for railroad
purposes); 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 117 (stating that a right of way used for purposes not
inconsistent with railroad purposes is not abandoned).
192. See Connelly, supra note 69, at 470. A court, however, may not weigh official
statements suggesting an intent to preserve a right of way as it would statements indicating
an intent to abandon. See i. Thus, the measure of intent in abandonment cases tends to
be objective in nature. See Wild, supra note 2, at 11.
193. See Connelly, supra note 69, at 470. The conversion of a track from a main line to
a spur, however, will not trigger an abandonment. See McGuire, 171 N.C. at 281-82, 88
S.E. at 339-40.
194. See Connelly, supra note 69, at 470. Conversely, a railroad may allow its right of
way to be occupied and used by others to facilitate the railroad's business. See McGuire,
171 N.C. at 282, 88 S.E. at 340 ("[A] railroad company may permit its customers to erect
elevators, corncribs, etc., which facilitate its business."). Also, in McGuire the Supreme
Court noted:
It is well settled that a railroad company does not abandon the land on which it
has constructed its tracks so as to entitle the owner to revoke its license by
ceasing to operate freight or passenger trains over it, where it continues to use it
for purposes incident to and connected with its business in operating the road.
Id. at 281-82, 88 S.E. at 339. Although the court decided McGuire prior to the
Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, Pub. L No. 91-152, 41 Stat. 456 (1920) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), which granted the ICC exclusive jurisdiction
over railroad abandonments, see Wild, supra note 2, at 4-5, the quoted excerpt suggests
that discontinuance of service (pursuant to a regulatory abandonment order) will not
automatically trigger an abandonment under state law. See McGuire, 171 N.C. at 281-82,
88 S.E. at 339.
195. See Connelly, supra note 69, at 498.
196. 26 N.C. App. 700,217 S.E.2d 112 (1975).
197. See id. at 703, 217 S.E.2d at 114.
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track to transfer ore from its mine to a distribution point connecting
with the railroad.' Although the North Carolina Court of Appeals
recognized that the lessee's use of the land served a purely private
purpose, the court nonetheless refused to find that the easement had
been abandoned because the lease reserved the railroad's right to
retake the right of way if necessary for future railroad use and "[t]he
use of the right-of-way [was] a legitimate use of railroad property for
railroad purposes."' On the other hand, if the railroad had
attempted to convey or sell a fee simple interest in the right of way
where it held only an easement, this action might have demonstrated
an intent to relinquish control of the corridor for railroad purposes
permanently, 0 in which case the easement would likely have
terminated unless sold in anticipation of further railroad use."0'
3. Removal of Tracks
The removal of tracks represents one of the most visible acts
suggesting an intent on the part of a railroad to abandon a right of
way. Coupled with nonuse for railroad purposes over a period of
time, such removal will likely result in abandonment.202  Taking up
tracks from a corridor, however, should not result in an immediate
termination of the right of way.2n In North Carolina, § 1-44.1 of the
General Statutes supports this conclusion by incorporating the
198. See id. at 702, 217 S.E.2d at 114. Private industries that utilize railroad equipment
do not fall within the scope of federal STB jurisdiction and are not considered quasi-public
corporations under state common law. See Montange, supra note 3, at 156.
199. Allen, 26 N.C. App. at 706,217 S.E.2d at 116. The railroad originally had acquired
the land by condemnation, which implicitly limited the use of the land to public purposes.
See id. at 705, 217 S.E.2d at 116; see also supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text
(discussing limitations imposed on property acquired through condemnation). Allen
introduces the notion that railroad easements may exist indefinitely so long as they are
used for railroad purposes.
200. See Connelly, supra note 69, at 499 (citing Barton v. Jarvis, 291 S.W. 38 (Ky.
1927)).
201. See id.; 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 117 (1951); see also 1 REDNELD, supra note 33, § 61,
at 236 (noting that abandonment may not occur on the sale of a right of way for future
railroad use). In City Motel, Inc. v. State, 336 P.2d 375 (Nev. 1959), the Nevada Supreme
Court held that an easement had terminated when a railroad attempted to convey it to the
State Department of Highways, which intended to use the right of way for a road. See id.
at 378-79. Despite so holding, the court suggested that the state might have preserved the
easement had it intended "to use the property for railroad purposes." Id. at 378; cf. Faus
v. City of Los Angeles, 431 P.2d 849, 854, 858 (Cal. 1967) (holding that substitution of bus
service for rail service over easements acquired for railroad purposes does not constitute
an abandonment).
202. See Connelly, supra note 69, at 470.
203. See id. But see Wild, supra note 2, at 11 (suggesting that removal of tracks will
trigger a reversion of interest).
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element of time (seven years) into the formula for presuming
abandonment after tracks are removed from a right of way.
2°4
Despite this apparently sound analysis, case law in North Carolina
implies that an abandonment may occur immediately upon the
removal of tracks from a corridor.
In 1958, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated in McCotter
v. Barnes2" that a railroad company's easement terminated "when its
tracks were removed and the railroad was abandoned.
20 6
Unfortunately, the court failed to clarify the definition of
abandonment beyond this ambiguous declaration.Y The oversight
bore no consequence in the case, however, since abandonment was
not at issue."8 Instead, the question presented to the court involved
only the interpretation of the original deed to a railroad and whether
that instrument conveyed an easement or fee simple interest to the
corporation.29 Neither party1° disputed the fact that the right of way
had been abandoned in 1952 when the railroad removed its tracks
and stopped using the corridor for railroad purposes.2 Thus, on
these limited facts, the court's definition of abandonment sufficed.
In 1986, the North Carolina Court of Appeals revived and
distorted the McCotter characterization of abandonment in
International Paper Co. v. Hufham." Once again, neither party in
the case contested the issue of abandonment, and the court of
appeals needed to decide only whether the original conveyance to
the predecessor railroad passed an easement or fee simple interest in
the right of way in question.' Citing McCotter, the court of appeals
stated that if only an easement existed in the corridor, it "ceased and
terminated when its tracks were removed and the railroad was
204. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-44.1 (1996).
205. 247 N.C. 480, 101 S.E.2d 330 (1958).
206. Id at 484,101 S.E.2d at 333 (emphasis added).
207. See id The ambiguity stems from the court's noting that the track removal and
abandonment coincided without stating whether the latter depended on the former. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. The plaintiff in the suit argued that they owned the fee simple interest in the strip
of land as successors in interest to the original corporation. See id at 481, 101 S.E.2d at
331. The defendants in the suit claimed to own the right of way as successors in interest to
the grantors who allegedly owned the fee simple interest to the land underlying the
abandoned railroad easement. See id. at 484,101 S.E.2d at 333.
211. See id. at 483, 101 S.E.2d at 331. Both parties agreed "[t]hat on or about the 31st
day of December, 1952, the railroad ... was abandoned by the railroad company and the
tracks removed, and it is no longer being used for railroad purposes." Id.
212. 81 N.C. App. 606,345 S.E.2d 231 (1986).
213. See id. at 609, 345 S.E.2d at 233.
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abandoned."214 The court of appeals subsequently held that the
easement terminated and that the extinct right of way belonged to
International Paper Co., the successor in interest to the original
underlying fee owners.2" Had the court of appeals stopped here, it
would not have upset the limited effect of McCotter.216 In the last
paragraph of its opinion, however, the court noted that "the estate of
[the railroad] ceased and terminated when it ceased rail traffic and
removed its tracks."2 7 Despite being couched in obiter dicta,21 1 this
statement might further confuse the law of abandonment among
unwary readers by reducing the proper circumstantial analysis to an
oversimplified inquiry as to when a railroad removed its tracks from
a right of way.
Misstatements as to the law of abandonment have not been
confined to North Carolina state courts. In Love v. United States,219
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina ventured to define abandonment as occurring "[u]pon
abandonment of railroad service. ' ' "o As in McCotter and Hufiam,
neither party in Love apparently contested the issue of
abandonment.l Among other issues, the complex facts of the case
raised a question as to whether the original railroad had obtained an
easement or fee simple interest in the contested right of way.' As in
214. Id. (citing McCoter, 247 N.C. at 484, 101 S.E.2d at 333).
215. See id. at 611, 345 S.E.2d at 234.
216. That is, the facts of the case did not require the court to elaborate any further on
the law of abandonment. The court could have resolved the dispute with no more than a
cursory treatment of abandonment, thereby avoiding potential confusion by delving
further into this relatively complex doctrine.
217. Id.
218. Since neither party contested the issue, see id. at 609, 345 S.E.2d at 233, the court
of appeals had no need to comment beyond stating that the corridor had been
"abandoned," as the North Carolina Supreme Court had done in McCotter, see McCotter,
247 N.C. at 484, 101 S.E.2d at 333.
219. 889 F. Supp. 1548 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
220. Id. at 1581. In its explication of the facts, the district court noted that the railroad
had removed its tracks from the right of way after abandoning service on the corridor
pursuant to an ICC order. See iUL at 1550-51. When it found that the railroad had held
only an easement, however, the district court characterized abandonment as dependent on
"abandonment of railroad service," without reference to the removal of tracks. See id. at
1581. If the opinion is read literally, the district court would find an abandonment even
before the tracks were removed from a right of way. See id. More likely, though, this
oversight simply reflected the inattention paid to the specifics of the issue by the district
court and the parties in the case.
221. See id. at 1550-51, 1581. The issue of abandonment did arise in the case with
regard to the type of interest acquired by the railroad. See id. at 1573-74.
222. See id. at 1581. Generally, the case involved a state condemnation action by the
North Carolina Department of Transportation over an abandoned railroad right of way
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McCotter and Hufham, the district court in Love only needed to
address abandonment in a most cursory fashion because this issue
bore no relation to the holding.'
These three cases demonstrate the potential for confusion in the
law of abandonment. Abandonment may occur where no interested
parties with standing contest the matter. Also, the circumstances in
these cases established without doubt that the railroads had no plans
to preserve the corridors for future railroad use.' The unclear
definitions of abandonment applied in each case were sufficient for
the limited fact situations presented. The North Carolina Supreme
Court, however, has not overturned the more complete definition of
abandonment provided in McGuire, which requires an intent to
abandon and outward manifestations of this intent as demonstrated
by external acts inconsistent with any claim of ownership.2 The
removal of tracks and the discontinuance of rail service may support
an abandonment determination, but these factors alone should not
trigger an abandonment because the requisite intent to abandon may
be lacking. To hold otherwise would oversimplify the rule in
McGuire, which comports with general principles of abandonment
law elsewhere.
VI. REVERSIONARY INTERFTS AND THE "PUBLIC HIGHWAY"
DOCTRINE
In its efforts to preserve railroad corridors that have not yet
been abandoned, the state may have the authority to alter or destroy
reversionary interests in qualified fee estates without compensating
the holder of such expectancies.2s The legislature may also have the
power to change the use of railroad easements without paying
bordering Pope Air Force Base in Cumberland County. See id. at 1550-53. Adjacent
landowners contested the federal government's ownership of the extinct right of way. See
id.
223. Compare id. at 1581 (stating that the easement terminated "[u]pon abandonment
of railroad service"), with McCotter v. Barnes, 247 N.C. 480, 484, 101 S.E.2d 330, 333
(1958) (stating that the easement terminated "when its tracks were removed and the
railroad was abandoned"), and International Paper Co. v. Hufham, 81 N.C. App. 606, 609,
345 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1986) (stating that the easement "ceased and terminated when its
tracks were removed and the railroad was abandoned").
224. See Love, 889 F. Supp. at 1581; McCouer, 247 N.C. at 483-84, 101 S.E.2d at 333;
Hufham, 81 N.C. App. at 609, 345 S.E.2d at 233. The factual patterns in these cases
underscore another obvious point: the combination of factors inferring an intent to
abandon may be so compelling as to obviate the need to address the issue except in
passing.
225. See supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
226. See infra notes 248-58 and accompanying text.
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underlying fee owners for the conversion pursuant to a
condemnation action.m North Carolina is one of a handful of states
that has adopted the "public highway" doctrine, which allows the
state to alter quasi-public easements on the theory that they were
established to serve broader public transportation purposes beyond
those anticipated at the time of acquisition.' As long as the public
places no greater burden on the easements than previously imposed
by the railroad use, the state need not compensate landowners for
the change.'m The "public highway" doctrine in North Carolina
appears to have emerged at the turn of the century from principles
relating to the destructibility of reversionary interests. This Part will
focus on the historical development and practical implications of
both the destructibility of reversionary interests and the "public
highway" doctrine.
The "public highway" doctrine in the context presented here
should not be confused with the separate but closely related question
of whether a railroad may unilaterally sanction the use of its right of
way for nonrailroad purposes without abandoning the corridor."0
Depending on the jurisdiction's flexibility, a court could find that a
railroad may lease its right of way for nonrailroad purposes without
affecting the termination of an easement, but still hold that
underlying fee owners are entitled to compensation for the
additional burden imposed by the new use."l Under the "public
highway" doctrine, the change in use would not trigger a valid
takings claim because the state initiated the conversion to further
future transportation purposes." Whether a railroad may alter the
use of its easements depends upon common law determinations as to
what properly constitutes a "railroad purpose."'n3 The objective of
227. See infra notes 259-68 and accompanying text.
228. See Montange, supra note 3, at 163-65; infra notes 269-317 and accompanying text.
229. See infra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
230. See Montange, supra note 3, at 163-64.
231. See Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 840 S.W.2d 904, 912-13 (Tenn. 1992);
Kristi Robbins Rezabek, Note, Property Law-Buhl v. U.S. Sprint Communications Co.:
Ascertaining the Rights of Fee Owners on Whose Land a Railroad Easement Exists, 22
MEI. ST. U. L REv. 843, 850-53 (1992); see also Query v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 178 N.C.
639, 640-41, 101 S.E. 390, 391 (1919) (holding that underlying fee owners are entitled to
compensation when a railroad allows telegraph use of a railroad easement). But see
Rezabek, supra, at 852-53 (criticizing the holding in Buhl).
232. See infra notes 326-31 and accompanying text.
233. A railroad acting on its own will be limited to using its right of way for only those
purposes identified in the instrument or statute under which the corridor was acquired.
See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text. Although the scope of a railroad right of
way is often limited to "railroad purposes," this term has been subject to varying judicial
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the following discussion, however, is not to focus on the scope of
railroad rights of way as defined by North Carolina statutory and
case law.' Rather, this part will examine the ability of the
legislature to modify the scope of railroad rights of way without
compensating affected property owners.
A. Background
1. Quasi-public Corporations
It is important to note at the outset that railroads, canal
companies, and similar corporations serving important public
functions are often referred to as "quasi-public" entities.2'" This
terminology does not relate to the legal structure of the company.2"
Except for the unique public benefits they provide, quasi-public
corporations usually have been organized and incorporated as purely
private enterprises.2"  Quasi-public corporations are not public
constructions over time. See Rezabek, supra note 231, at 845-48. The North Carolina
Supreme Court has adopted an "incidental use" standard to define "railroad purposes."
See Raleigh, Charlotte & S. Ry. v. McGuire, 171 N.C. 277, 282-83, 88 S.E. 337, 339-40
(1916); supra note 194 and accompanying text (discussing and quoting McGuire); see also
Wallace v. Moore, 178 N.C. 114, 116, 100 S.E. 237, 238 (1919) (noting that the purposes of
constructing and operating a railroad are "restricted usually to a proper right of way and
the necessary terminal facilities"). See generally 74 CJ.S. Railroads § 73, at 450-51 (1951)
(discussing a railroad company's "power to acquire, hold, and use necessary real estate for
the construction, maintenance, and operation of its road"); Rezabek, supra note 231, at
851-53 (discussing Tennessee's adoption of the "incidental use" doctrine). Also, the North
Carolina legislature indirectly has defined the scope of railroad purposes in North Carolina
General Statutes § 62-220, which categorizes the various powers granted to railroad
corporations. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-220 (1986).
234. For a general discussion of the scope of easements in North Carolina, see 1
WEBSTER, supra note 37, §§ 15-21, 15-23, and 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY,
THOMAS EDITION § 60.04 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994) (outlining principles related to
scope of easements in general). See also Swaim v. Simpson, 120 N.C. App. 863, 864-65,
463 S.E.2d 785,786-87 (1995) (discussing the general law in North Carolina as to the scope
of easements), aff'd mer., 343 N.C. 298, 469 S.E.2d 553 (1996).
235. See, e.g., State v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 326, 233 S.E.2d 895, 905 (1977);
Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 240 N.C. 495, 514, 82 S.E.2d 771, 784
(1954); Torrence v. City of Charlotte, 163 N.C. 562, 567, 80 S.E. 53, 54 (1913); Geer v.
Durham Water Co., 127 N.C. 349, 354, 37 S.E. 474, 476 (1900); Lassiter v. Norfolk &
Carolina R.R., 126 N.C. 509, 511-12, 36 S.E. 48, 49 (1900); Barcello v. Hapgood, 118 N.C.
712,729-30,24 S.E. 124, 126 (1896); Bass v. Roanoke Navigation & Waterpower Co., 111
N.C. 439, 447, 16 S.E. 402, 404 (1892); Centre Dev. Co. v. County of Wilson, 44 N.C. App.
469, 471, 261 S.E.2d 275, 277 (1980); 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 63 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990); 2
WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 19-4 (discussing what parties are authorized to use the power
of eminent domain).
236. See 1 FLETCHERETAL., supra note 235, § 63, at 900-01.
237. See id. at 901 ("[A] corporation which has received no special privileges or
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corporations," s but are defined "as private corporations which have
accepted from the state the grant of franchise or contract involving
the performance of public duties. '' 9 Because of their unique status,
railroads traditionally have been limited in their ability to alienate
property necessary to serve the public purposes for which the state
authorized incorporation.' As will be demonstrated in the
following sections,241 the power of the state to preserve railroad rights
of way for future public use stems partly from the legislature's
inherent authority to oversee property transfers by quasi-public
corporations.
2. Constitutionally Protected Property Rights
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution requires the payment of just compensation for
any "private property taken for public use. '242 While, on its own, the
benefits of great value from the state is not a quasi-public corporation."); 1 REDFIELD,
supra note 33, § 17, at 57 (referring to the private nature of railroad companies as meaning
nothing more than that the "stock is owned by private persons").
238. See 1 FLETCHER Er AL., supra note 235, § 63; see also HENN & ALEXANDER,
supra note 111, § 12, at 25; ORTH, supra note 31, at 142; ROBINsON, supra note 111, § 6-6,
at 111 & n.23 (identifying characteristics that distinguish public and private corporations in
North Carolina).
239. 1 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 235, § 63, at 901. The government has always
maintained some control over providers of transportation, or "common carriers":
In short, the notion behind common carriage was that the government would
grant the carrier certain powers and privileges, generally conferring an exclusive
right to make a profit from transportation. In return for these privileges, the
carrier was expected to assume certain obligations....
1. The carrier may not refuse to serve.
2. The carrier must serve at a reasonable price.
3. The carrier must serve all equally.
4. The carrier is responsible for the safe delivery of the goods or persons
committed to its care.
KEELER, supra note 4, at 20.
240. See 6A FLETCHER Er AL., supra note 235, § 2955 ("This principle [of lack of
authority to transfer assets] applies to all corporations which are given the power of
eminent domain or other special privileges, and which, in return, are under a special duty
to serve the public .... "); 1 REDFIELD, supra note 33, § 17, at 58 n.7 (discussing the
importance of the legislature's retention of control over railroads in light of the vast
expenditures dedicated to railroad projects and the degree to which these corporations
affect citizens' lives). A railroad, however, may dispose of property not needed to serve
the public purpose. See 6A FLETCHER Er AL., supra note 235, § 2956. Otherwise, a
railroad could never abandon unnecessary rights of way.
241. See infra notes 281-93 and accompanying text.
242. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause, found in the last clause of the Fifth
Amendment, reads: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." Id.; see also Summers, supra note 31, at 837-38 (discussing generally the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
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Fifth Amendment applies only to federal action, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends Fifth Amendment
restrictions to state action.'" Although the North Carolina
Constitution contains no explicit Takings Clause, Article I, Section
19 implicitly provides protections identical to those contained in the
Fifth Amendment.2
The government must compensate an individual only for the
taking of constitutionally protected property interests defined by
state common law. 45 To secure compensation for the change in use
of a railroad easement by the state, for instance, an underlying fee
owner would initiate an inverse condemnation action. 46 This remedy
exists by virtue of North Carolina General Statutes § 40A-51(a),
which allows the property owner to "seek compensation for a taking
whenever his private property is taken for a public purpose by a
municipality or other agency having the power of eminent domain
under circumstances where a condemnor takes property for which no
complaint containing a declaration of taking has been filed." 247
A property owner must show an "actual interference" with a
protected property right to recover damages for a taking.2' North
Carolina courts have defined constitutionally protected property
243. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 233-35 (1897); ORTH, supra note 31, at 57. For an interesting discussion of
the historical relationship between the Due Process and Takings Clauses and the need to
separate the two for purposes of analyzing takings claims, see Summers, supra note 31,
passim (focusing on regulatory takings issues).
244. Article I, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution provides:
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or
privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or
property, but by the law of the land. No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws; nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the
State because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; see also ORTH, supra note 31, at 55-60 (providing a historical and
analytical framework of § 19); supra note 31 (discussing § 19 and North Carolina's takings
jurisprudence). See generally ORTH, supra note 31, at 1-24 (recounting the historical
development of North Carolina's constitution).
245. See Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 21 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Determining
what interest petitioners would have enjoyed under Vermont law, in the absence of the
ICC's recent actions, will establish whether petitioners possess the predicate property
interest that must underlie any takings claim.").
246. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-51(a) (1984); 2 WEBSTER, supra note 37, §§ 19-2, -
2(a) (discussing government actions which may give rise to valid inverse condemnation
actions).
247. 2 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 19-2; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-51(a).
248. See 2 WEBSTFR, supra note 37, § 19-2, at 810; see also Parker, supra note 31, at
300-01 (discussing when compensation is required for a taking of property).
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rights as those interests which have "vested.""24  In contrast,
reversionary and "contingent" interests may warrant no such
protection because they represent only "bare expectanc[ies]"' 0 that a
right may vest, and "more than a mere expectation '' "1 is required to
invoke constitutional safeguards.l 2 The clarity of this distinction
between vested and contingent interests leaves much to be desired,
especially considering the confusion that could arise regarding
contingent remainders and other future interests in third persons.'
Put more simply, reversionary interests retained by grantors of
fee determinable and fee subject to condition subsequent estates may
draw little or no constitutional protection because the fee may never
revert.2 North Carolina courts have characterized this
indeterminate quality of reversionary interests by labeling them
"bare expectancies." 5 These interests are alienable, however, under
North Carolina General Statutes § 39-6.3(a)," 6 which implies that
249. See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Dwyer, 338 N.C. 445, 447, 450 S.E.2d 888, 890
(1994); Anderson v. Wilkins, 142 N.C. 154, 157-58, 55 S.E. 272, 273 (1906); Springs v.
Scott, 132 N.C. 548,560, 44 S.E. 116, 120 (1903); Lowe v. Harris, 112 N.C. 473, 480-86, 17
S.E. 539, 540-44 (1893); Bass v. Roanoke Navigation & Water Co., 111 N.C. 439, 448-49,
16 S.E. 402, 405 (1892); De Lotbiniere v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 2 N.C. App. 252,
261,163 S.E.2d 59, 65 (1968).
250. Bass, 111 N.C. at 448-49, 16 S.E. at 405.
251. Dwyer, 338 N.C. at 447, 450 S.E.2d at 890.
252. See id.; Anderson, 142 N.C. at 158,55 S.E. at 273; Springs, 132 N.C. at 560, 44 S.E.
at 120; Lowe, 112 N.C. at 480-86, 17 S.E. at 540-44; Bass, 111 N.C. at 448-49, 16 S.E. at
405; De Lotbiniere, 2 N.C. App. at 260,163 S.E.2d at 64-65.
253. See, e.g., 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 3-2, at 51 (distinguishing types of future
interests in general). Webster distinguishes vested and contingent future estates in third
persons as follows:
A future interest is vested where it is given to a born and ascertainable person
and the interest is subject to no condition precedent other than the natural
expiration of the prior estate or estates. It is contingent where the transferee is
an unborn or otherwise unascertained person or the interest is subject to a
condition precedent. Contingent remainders are subject to the perplexing
application of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Id. at 51-52. The reversionary interests associated with fee determinable and fee subject
to condition subsequent estates, however, are retained by the grantor. See id.
254. See Bass, 111 N.C. at 448-49, 16 S.E. at 405; 3 GEORGE W. THOMPSON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 33 2112, 2116 (1924)
(treating fee determinable and fee subject to condition subsequent estates similarly for
purposes of general characterization of reversionary interests). Webster, however,
suggests that a reversionary interest is a "presently protectable right to a future interest,"
but fails to cite any authority for the proposition. See 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 3-2, at
51.
255. See Bass, 111 N.C. at 448-49, 16 S.E. at 405.
256. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6.3(a) (1984); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-2(2)(b)
(including reversionary interests among the "estate" of a decedent for the purposes of
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reversionary interests constitute more than "bare expectancies."
This contradictory treatment of reversionary interests among the
courts and the legislature raises a question as to whether the state
may alter or destroy reversionary interests without compensation to
the owner because she holds no enforceable property right. 7 When
possible, courts might avoid this ambiguity by categorizing rights of
way as either fee simple estates or easements, thereby avoiding the
qualified fee designation altogether. 8
An easement represents a right to use the property of another
for a specific purpose."9 The grantor of an easement retains title to
the underlying estate" and, in the case of railroad rights of way, may
use land underlying the easement to such an extent as not to impede
the operations of the railroad.26' The easement may terminate upon
intestate succession); 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 4-13(a) (discussing reversionary
interests). The alienability of reversionary interests may be treated differently in other
jurisdictions. See 3 THOMPSON, supra note 254, § 2112 (stating that reversionary interests
are not alienable). Reversionary interests generally are not subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities. See id. § 2119; 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 4-14, at 80.
257. See Torrence v. City of Charlotte, 163 N.C. 562, 565-66, 80 S.E. 53, 54 (1913);
Bass, 111 N.C. at 448-49, 16 S.E. at 405; 3 THOMPSON, supra note 254, § 2112. Thompson
describes reversionary interests retained by the grantor in fee estates as follows:
The possibility of a reverter, after the termination of a fee conditional, being a
mere possibility, is not an estate, and may be defeated by statutory enactment. It
is not an estate in land, and until the contingency of the condition happens the
whole title is in the grantee, and the grantor has nothing he can convey. It is
neither a present nor a future right, but a mere possibility that a right may arise
on the happening of a contingency .... This possibility of reverter, however,
being a vested interest in real property, is capable at all times of being released
to the person holding the estate on condition ... and if so released vests an
absolute and indefeasible title thereto.
3 THOMPSON, supra note 254, § 2112 (footnotes omitted). This characterization closely
matches that adopted by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Bass, except that
Thompson suggests that a reversionary interest is vested in the grantor, see id., whereas
the court in Bass held that it is not so vested, see Bass, 111 N.C. at 448-49, 16 S.E. at 405.
Webster would likely attribute such a discrepancy to jurisdictional variations on the use of
terminology, see 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 3-2, at 51, although the substance of
Thompson's description falls squarely in line with the North Carolina Supreme Court's
perspective on the broader issue of destructibility.
258. See, e.g., N.C. State Highway Comm'n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 472, 189
S.E.2d 272, 279-80 (1972) (discussing railroad rights of way exclusively in terms of fee
simple estates or easements). Of course, this option may not be available if the conveying
instrument explicitly creates a qualified fee estate. See supra notes 125-28 and
accompanying text.
259. See 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-1, at 593 & n.4 (describing characteristics of
easements in general) (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944)).
260. See id. § 15-1.
261. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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abandonment or misuse by its owner.2 2 The grantor may alienate
the underlying fee, but the estate will remain subject to the
easement."' North Carolina courts have treated the servient estates
underlying public and quasi-public easements as though the grantor
retained only a "contingent" interest in the possible termination of
the easement.2 ' By this rationale, the legislature could modify the
use of the easement as long as the state imposed no greater burden
on the easement than that for which it was originally acquired."
Thus, a railroad easement could exist in perpetuity so long as the
subsequent uses of the right of way were no more burdensome than
the railroad use 2 ---a likely circumstance.267  This principle
concerning the convertibility of easements is often referred to as the
"public highway" doctrine.2
262- See 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, §§ 15-27, -29.
263. 1 THOMPSON, supra note 254, § 285, at 366; supra notes 129-33 and accompanying
text.
264. See Parker, supra note 31, at 303 (citing Bass v. Roanoke Navigation &
Waterpower Co., 111 N.C. 439, 16 S.E. 402 (1892)); infra notes 308-317 and accompanying
text.
265. See Parker, supra note 31, at 303; infra notes 308-309 and accompanying text.
266. This conclusion may be unnecessarily narrow, however, especially with regard to
public easements. ln Frink v. North Carolina Board of Transportation, 41 N.C. App. 751,
255 S.E.2d 746 (1979), the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the landowner's
inverse condemnation claim where the NCDOT built roads and bridges on rights of way
originally acquired by the state for the Intracoastal Waterway. See id. at 751, 754-56, 255
S.E.2d at 747-49. The court held that "when the State acquired its interest in the property
for the canal right-of-way, it also clearly acquired the inherent right to construct bridges
and roadways across the property." Id. at 755, 255 S.E.2d at 748-49. The holding may be
significant in the railroad context because it allows the accumulation of public burdens on
an existing easement, originally condemned for a limited purpose, without providing
additional compensation to the underlying fee owners. The United States Supreme Court
extensively discussed Congress's power to authorize the placement of telegraph lines on
railroad corridors in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 195 U.S. 540
(1904). The dispute in Western Union concerned the right of telegraph companies to
install lines on railroad rights of way pursuant to state and federal statutes providing for
such use. See id. at 541-46. More pertinent to the present analysis, the Court implicitly
recognized the power of Congress to appropriate railroad property for other than railroad
purposes without affording underlying fee owners any compensation for the additional
burden imposed by the telegraph use-the case addressed only the right of the railroad to
compensation for use of its right of way by the telegraph company. See id. at 557-60, 569-
70.
267. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
268. See Montange, supra note 3, at 163.
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B. Historical Foundations for Destructibility of Reversionary
Interests and the "Public Highway" Doctrine
1. Bass v. Roanoke Navigation & Water Power Co.
In 1892, the North Carolina Supreme Court first recognized that
reversionary interests in railroad rights of way may enjoy no
constitutional protection in Bass v. Roanoke Navigation & Water
Power Co."' The plaintiff landowner in Bass sued the Roanoke
Navigation & Water Power Co. to recover property condemned by a
predecessor canal corporation."o The plaintiff claimed that the right
of way reverted to her in the 1870s when the prior corporation
dissolved, passing all rights and interests by sale to the defendant
company." The landowner grounded her argument on the fact that
the legislature authorized the original corporation, the Roanoke
Navigation Company, to condemn right of way for a canal for
navigation purposes only.' However, the legislative charter creating
the Roanoke Navigation & Water Power Company, the successor
corporation, empowered the new corporation to use the right of way
not only for navigation purposes, but also for "'manufacturing, or
other purposes.' " The plaintiff contended that the company's
change in use triggered a reversion.' She also challenged the
constitutionality of the new corporation's charter on the grounds that
the legislature purported to encumber her reversionary interest with
additional uses not authorized at the time of the original
condemnation around 1820Y5
In Bass, the North Carolina Supreme Court focused primarily
on the right of the state to modify or destroy contingent interests in
property." ' To understand the scope of the holding in Bass, a few
preliminary issues must be noted. First, the opinion failed to clarify
the type of interest originally condemned by the Roanoke
269. 111 N.C. 439,16 S.E. 402 (1892).
270. See id. at 452-56,16 S.E. at 406-07.
271. See id.
272. See id at 449-53, 16 S.E. at 405-06; An Act for Improving the Navigation of
Roanoke River, Pub. L., ch. 848, art. 12 (1812) (authorizing the corporation to purchase or
condemn land where "it may be necessary to complete the navigation" of the Roanoke
River).
273. Bass, III N.C. at 450, 16 S.E. at 406 (quoting An Act to Promote the Objects of
the Roanoke Navigation and Water Power Company, Priv. L., ch. 57, § 1 (1885)).
274. See id. at 453,16 S.E. at 406.
275. See id. at 448-49, 16 S.E. at 405.
276. See id. at 447-50,16 S.E. at 404-05.
2034 [Vol. 75
1997] RAIL CORRIDORS 2035
Navigation Company, but intimated that the Company had acquired
a qualified fee in its right of way.m Although easements are not
mentioned, the court's analysis implied that the state may modify the
use of easements to ensure preservation of contiguous corridors for
future public purposesY8  Finally, the court suggested that its
analysis applied not only to condemned property, but also to rights
of way obtained by agreement."
Rather than simply finding that reversionary interests in canal
rights of way fell under the umbrella of constitutionally unprotected
contingent interests, the court in Bass devoted considerable attention
to the rationale underlying its ultimate conclusion." ° First, the court
expounded upon the special relationship existing between the state
and quasi-public corporations such as canal and railroad
companies." In this case, the legislature conferred upon the canal
277. See id. at 447, 16 S.E. at 404. The charter under which the Roanoke Navigation
Company had originally acquired a right of way for the canal allowed land taken by
condemnation or sale to be "seised in fee [in the company] ... in the same manner as if
conveyed to them by the owners, by legal conveyance." An Act for Improving the
Navigation of Roanoke River, Pub. L, ch. 848, art. 12. This language suggests that the
corporation acquired the fee simple to the land needed to build the canal. The court in
Bass quoted article 8 of the charter to describe the property interests taken by the
corporation, see Bass, 111 N.C. at 447, 16 S.E. at 404 (noting that land acquired by the
corporation shall be "'vested in the said proprietors, their heirs and assigns, forever, as
tenants in common in proportion to their respective shares' "), but article 8 refers only to
the "works" constructed by the corporation and not to land explicitly, see An Act for
Improving the Navigation of Roanoke River, Pub. L., ch. 848, art. 8. Although the
language in both articles 8 and 12 suggest that the corporation had acquired a fee simple in
the property, the court later noted that the legislature had authorized the company to
"hold lands in fee for a particular purpose." Bass, 111 N.C. at 447, 16 S.E. at 404
(emphasis added). This added restriction indicates an apparent belief by the court that the
canal corporation had acquired only a qualified fee in its right of way, subject to reversion
should the right of way be dedicated to another purpose. But see Parker, supra note 31, at
303 (assuming that the court in Bass found an easement in the right of way defeasible at
the will of the state because the owners' "possibility of reverter is a contingent claim").
278. It is important to remember that most rights of way will be acquired by a variety
of means, giving the railroad corporation several types of property interests in a corridor.
See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text. Although Bass may have addressed only
reversionary interests associated with land held in qualified fee, the court would have
undermined the reasoning it gives for preserving contiguous "channel[s] of commerce" had
it not assumed that the state also could modify easements for continued public use. See
Bass, 111 N.C. at 447,16 S.E. at 404; see also Parker, supra note 31, at 303 (stating that the
right of way in Bass was held in easement); infra notes 326-329 (discussing generally policy
considerations regarding the holding in Bass).
279. See Bass, 111 N.C. at 447, 16 S.E. at 404; see also infra notes 326-29 and
accompanying text (discussing generally policy considerations regarding the holding in
Bass).
280. See Bass, 111 N.C. at 447-50,16 S.E. at 404-05.
281. See id.
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company broad powers necessary to establish a transportation
corridor of potentially infinite duration.' As evidence of the
important public purposes served by quasi-public corporations, the
court noted that the legislature had granted the corporation the
power of eminent domain, a property acquisition tool reserved only
for public ends.'
The court explained that the public interest in a quasi-public
corporation does not cease upon completion of the project at hand.
Instead, the legislature maintains a stake in the continuing viability
of such enterprises for the public benefit.' Thus, when a
corporation fails to conform to the purposes identified in its charter
or dissolves for some other reason, the legislature may exercise
control over the resolution of its indebtedness and the disposition of
its property.' The legislature manifested such authority in this case
by chartering the Roanoke Navigation & Water Power Company in
1885, empowering it to succeed to all of the interests and rights of the
former Roanoke Navigation Company. 6
The court noted that the legislature may not disturb vested
rights and contracts in enacting retroactive legislation.' Here, the
new charter had a retroactive effect because it impacted obligations
incurred prior to its passage.' Specifically, the new charter
282. See id. at 447,16 S.E. at 404.
283. See id. at 447, 16 S.E. at 404-05; An Act for Improving the Navigation of Roanoke
River, Pub. L, ch. 848, art. 12 (1812).
284. See Bass, 111 N.C. at 448,16 S.E. at 405. The court stated:
The primary object in permitting the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent
domain was to take the land for a public purpose, and the condition implied by
the very creation of the corporation, was that ... it, or another similar agency,
should subserve the end for which it was brought into existence; the power of the
state being subject only to the limitations imposed by the constitutions, State and
Federal.
Id. The constitutional limitations to which the court alluded are discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 287-93.
285. See Bass, 111 N.C. at 447-48, 16 S.E. at 405; see also 1 REDFIELD, supra note 33,
§ 69, at 270 n.17 ("[B]y the repeal of a charter the lands do not revert to the former owner,
but the franchises of the corporation are resumed by the state, and the railway remains
public property, subject to the management and control of the state.").
286. See An Act to Promote the Objects of the Roanoke Navigation and Water Power
Company, Priv. L., ch. 57, § 1 (1885); Bass, 111 N.C. at 449-50, 16 S.E. at 405-06. Before
dissolution, the court appointed a receiver to the Roanoke Navigation Company and
ordered the conveyance of all that corporation's property and rights to the new Roanoke
Navigation & Water Power Company pursuant to the latter's charter. See Bass, 111 N.C.
at 450, 16 S.E. at 405; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-290, -291 (1989) (containing
provisions relevant to transfer of railroad property upon corporate dissolution).
287. See Bass, 111 N.C. at 448-49, 16 S.E. at 405.
288. See id.
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indefinitely postponed the possibility of reverter held by landowners
owning property contiguous to the canal right of way.' The court
held that this action did not constitute a taking because these
reversionary interests represented only "expectanc[ies] defeasible at
the will of the state."' Such a conclusion drew support from the
inherent authority of the state to supervise quasi-public corporations
to ensure the existence of an entity to maintain transportation
corridors for future public use. 1 Further, the court analogized the
situation in Bass to other contexts in which the state affects
reversionary interests, including the destruction of rights of
survivorship by statutes converting joint tenancies into tenancies in
common and the renaming of heir presumptives under intestate
statutes.' In Bass, as in these latter cases, these "bare expectanc[ies]
... may be modified or destroyed at the will of the lawmakers by
statute.' '93
Upon reaching this conclusion, the court next addressed the
change in use of the right of way as authorized by the new corporate
charter.' The original Roanoke Navigation Company charter
granted the corporation authority to build a canal for "navigation" of
the Roanoke River.' The new charter empowered the Roanoke
Navigation & Water Power Company to implement the same uses as
its predecessor, including the right to use the canal for
"manufacturing, or other purposes. ' The court dismissed the
argument that these additional burdens constituted an
unconstitutional taking by emphasizing the authority of the
289. See id.
290. Id. at 449, 16 S.E. at 405.
291. See id. at 447-48,16 S.E. at 405.
292. See id. at 449,16 S.E. at 405. The court specifically noted the following:
[A] bare expectancy, such as that of the heir presumptive under the canons of
descent, the devisee named in a last will and testament executed by a person still
living, the claim to rights by survivorship by a joint tenant, where a statute has
made them tenants in common, the right to a forfeiture of interest reserved on a
contract on account of usury, is not (as it has been held) protected as a vested
right, but may be modified or destroyed at the will of the lawmakers by statute.
Id.
293. Id. (citations omitted).
294. See id. at 449-52, 16 S.E. at 406; An Act to Promote the Objects of the Roanoke
Navigation and Water Power Company, Priv. L, ch. 57, § 1 (1885).
295. See An Act for Improving the Navigation of Roanoke River, Pub. L, ch. 848, art.
12 (1812); Bass, 111 N.C. at 449-51, 16 S.E. at 406.
296. An Act to Promote the Objects of the Roanoke Navigation and Water Power
Company, Priv. L, ch. 57, § 1; see also Bass, 111 N.C. at 449-50, 16 S.E. at 406 (citing the
new charter).
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legislature to expand the powers of corporations after their
formation so long as it did not interfere with vested rights.' Since a
possibility of reverter constituted only a reversionary interest, the
legislature did not affect a compensable taking in this case by merely
modifying the contingent event that would trigger a reversion.'
2. Torrence v. City of Charlotte
The North Carolina Supreme Court subsequently affirmed that
a bare expectancy is not a constitutionally protected vested right
when it decided Torrence v. City of Charlotte.'" In Torrence, the
Charlotte Waterworks Company, a public corporation, attempted to
convey nine acres of land to the Charlotte Park Commission for use
as a public park."' The waterworks corporation originally
condemned the property for "waterworks purposes. ' 1 Noting this
restriction, the plaintiff landowners"° brought an action against the
park commission to recover the land when its use changed, arguing
that the waterworks corporation had acquired only an easement by
condemnation.3' The city responded that it owned a fee simple
interest in the property with no attendant residual interest in the
plaintiffs.
3 4
297. See Bass, 111 N.C. at 452-53, 16 S.E. at 406. The court explained in no uncertain
terms:
Unless the power is specially reserved when the charter is granted, or under the
Constitution or general laws, the Legislature cannot, as a general rule, modify the
charter so as to take away any power which would enure to the profit of, or prove
a protection to, a company from loss; but there is no restriction upon the right of
the sovereign to enlarge its powers or extend its privileges, except that, in doing
so, it must not infringe upon the vested rights of another. If there was no
authority given to the old company, either in terms or by necessary implication,
to erect manufacturing establishments, and use the water for running them and
others owned by landowners in the vicinity, the Legislature unquestionably had
the power to grant de novo all of the privileges enumerated [in the charter] if
such action was in conflict with no right but only with the claim of the plaintiff...
to the possibility of reverter....
Id.
298. See id.
299. 163 N.C. 562,565-66,80 S.E. 53,54 (1913).
300. See id. at 563-64,80 S.E. at 53.
301. Id. at 564, 80 S.E. at 53. The term "waterworks" here referred to the use of the
property for a city pumping station and reservoir, as distinguished from the "waterworks"
in Bass, which included navigation and possibly manufacturing purposes. See Ud; supra
notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
302. The plaintiffs were the heirs and devisees of the original grantors of the land. See
Torrence, 163 N.C. at 563, 80 S.E. at 53.
303. See id. at 564,80 S.E. at 53.
304. See id.
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Construing the eminent domain statute under which the
waterworks corporation initiated condemnation proceedings,3 '0 the
court concluded that the company had acquired an indefeasible fee
in the property."° The court also debunked the old common law rule
that upon dissolution of a private corporation, all real property of
the corporation reverted to the original grantors or their heirs,
regardless of the type of interest held by the corporation.
Conceding for the sake of argument that only an easement had been
acquired, the court noted that the legislature clearly possessed the
authority to change the public use of the land from "waterworks to
that of a public park; the latter being not less advantageous or more
burdensome to the contiguous landowners."'  Although citing Bass
305. See N.C. Battle's Revisal, ch. 62, § 20 (1873) ("On the confirmation of the report,
and payment to the owner or into the office of the court, of the damages assessed, the land
assessed and condemned shall be vested in the company in fee simple.").
306. See Torrence, 163 N.C. at 564, 80 S.E. at 53-54.
307. See id at 566-67, 80 S.E. at 54-55 (citing authorities). Henn & Alexander address
this now defunct common law most succinctly:
Under the early common law in North Carolina, the dissolution of a corporation
so completely terminated its existence that title to the corporate real estate
reverted to the original grantor, the personal property escheated to the State, and
all debts both to and from the corporation immediately expired. This "barbarous
rule of the common law" was soon abolished, both by court decision and by
statute.
HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 111, § 12, at 25; ORTH, supra note 31, at 142;
ROBINSON, supra note 111, § 28-1, at 537-38 (footnotes omitted). The court stated the
new rule as to reversion of fee interests upon dissolution of a corporation by citing Wilson
v. Leafy, 120 N.C. 90, 25 S.E. 630 (1897), which overruled Fox v. Horah, 36 N.C. 358
(1841), the prior case expounding the old common law rule. See Torrence, 163 N.C. at 566,
80 S.E. at 54. Citing Wilson, the court discussed the new rule:
"Upon the dissolution or extinction of a corporation for any cause, real property
conveyed to it in fee does not revert to the original grantors or their heirs, and its
personal property does not escheat to the State, and this is so whether or not the
corporation was limited by its charter or general statute."
Id. at 566, 80 S.E. at 54 (quoting Wilson, 120 N.C. at 93, 25 S.E. at 631, but making a
number of word changes). The court continued:
[I]t is said that a reverter applies only to a restricted class of corporations; as, for
instance, where a railroad company acquired a right of way as an easement, and,
on the cessation of such easement the land is relieved of that burden. Land taken
for waterworks is for a "public use." That taken for a railroad is taken for a
"quasi-public use" only.
Id. at 566-67, 80 S.E. at 54. The court's comparison between public and quasi-public
easements is ambiguous with regard to the dissolution of corporations. Taken in context of
the discussion in Torrence, the opinion appears to suggest that public easements will not
extinguish on dissolution of public corporations, regardless of whether the legislature
authorized their transfer and preservation. Quasi-public easements, on the other hand,
apparently would terminate unless saved by legislative action.
308. Torrence, 163 N.C. at 565,80 S.E. at 54.
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to support this proposition, the Torrence court expressly qualified
the broad legislative discretion propounded in Bass by restricting the
modification of easements to new uses which were not "less
advantageous or more burdensome" than prior uses."°
Such a limitation on the legislature's authority to alter the use of
easements exists in other states as well. 1° For instance, in Torrence
the court cited Malone v. Toledo,"' an Ohio case where a landowner
brought a quiet title action to prevent the city of Toledo from
converting an abandoned canal into a highway and public utility
right of way." The Ohio Supreme Court refused to determine the
extent of the interest originally obtained by the state for the canal.3
Rather, the court focused on the authority of the legislature to alter
the use of qualified fee estates or easements from one public purpose
to another."4 Like the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in
309. Id.; see also Parker, supra note 31, at 303 ("It is generally held that the owner
should be compensated for takings where additional servitudes which cause additional
damages are placed on the land.").
310. See, e.g., Fritsch v. ICC, 59 F.3d 248, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (raising the issue, but
not resolving it on the given facts), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1262 (1996); Faus v. City of Los
Angeles, 431 P.2d 849, 856 (Cal. 1967) (holding that a trolley line may be upgraded to a
busway); McKinley v. Waterloo R.R., 368 N.W.2d 131, 134-35 (Iowa 1985) (citing
authorities, but not holding on the issue); Pollnow v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 276
N.W.2d 738, 746 (Wis. 1979) (reserving judgment on whether the state can preserve
existing railroad rights of way for multiple public uses).
311. 28 Ohio St. 643 (1876).
312. See id. at 653-54. The state had originally condemned the land for the canal around
1836. See iL at 653. This case is distinguishable from Bass in that Ohio formed a public
board of canal commissioners to oversee and operate the canal, whereas in Bass the canal
companies were quasi-public corporations. See id; Bass v. Roanoke Navigation & Water
Power Co., 111 N.C. 439, 447, 449-50, 16 S.E. 402, 404, 405 (1892). In Malone, the
legislature had conveyed the right of way to the city in 1864 and authorized that the use be
changed from canal purposes to those requested by the city. See Malone, 28 Ohio St. at
653-54. The landowner argued that the state had acquired only a qualified fee in the
corridor, contingent on its use for canal purposes only. See id. at 655. The state contended
that it had condemned the land in fee simple absolute as was authorized by the statute
under which the state had acted. See id.
313. See Malone, 28 Ohio St. at 655-56.
314. See id at 656-57. The court explained:
[W]hatever the estate is, or however denominated, whether fee or easement, as
to all property appropriated, under the exercise of the law of eminent domain, we
think this proposition may be established. When real estate is so appropriated,
for one particular public purpose, the fact that it is by legislative authority
applied to another public purpose is not necessarily an abandonment, nor is it a
forfeiture of the public interest.
Id. at 656. The court did not explicitly differentiate between public and quasi-public
corporations. See iU. at 656-57. In fact, it implied, by including railroad examples in its
discussion of other public uses, that the legislature's authority clearly extended to both
types of corporate entities. See id. at 656. After positing the rule as to the legislature's
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Torrence, Malone expressly restricted the ability of the state to
impose more burdensome uses on preexisting public easements
without providing compensation." The court adopted a "like kind"
standard to determine whether two uses were so different as to
warrant the payment of compensation to adjoining landowners.1
Applying this principle to the facts in Malone, the court held that the
change in use of the right of way from canal purposes to highway and
utility purposes did not constitute an additional servitude requiring
compensation?
C. Implications of the North Carolina "Public Highway" Doctrine
The North Carolina legislature has not yet explicitly invoked the
"public highway" doctrine in its statutory efforts to preserve railroad
authority to change the use of public easements, the court cited numerous examples
demonstrating the common usage of this power
Instances are abundant in the legislation of the state where land has been taken
for one purpose and used for another, without objection or complaint from any
one. Railroads cross highways, and no one has ever supposed that this was such
an abandonment of the highway as that the soil reverted to the original owner.
So canals have been allowed to use a portion of turnpikes .... [A]n ordinary road
was converted into a plankroad .... [A] canal was converted into a railroad, but
it was held that this did not work a reversion of the canal bed to the original
proprietor. It is now every day's experience that streets are used by
railroads ....
All these are instances where property was appropriated to one particular
use, and afterward, by legislative consent, applied to another of a like kind.
Id. (citations omitted); cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-220(6), (7) (1986) (authorizing railroad
rights of way to cross other railroad rights of way and public highways). The facts of the
case and the court's discussion may have limited Malone's applicability to condemned
property, although arguably the case's holding should apply with equal force to all public
or quasi-public property regardless of the manner of acquisition. See Malone, 28 Ohio St.
at 656-60; infra notes 326-45 and accompanying text (discussing why the "public highway"
doctrine should apply to property acquired by any means).
315. See Malone, 28 Ohio St. at 657-61. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, suggested
that only adjoining landowners would be entitled to additional compensation under these
circumstances for the additional inconvenience created by the new use. See id. at 657-58.
If this reading is correct, holders of residual interests could not claim a taking unless the
remainder of their present estate lay adjacent to the land in which they held an interest.
See id.
316. See id. at 656. The court offered some clarification of this standard in a
subsequent passage: "[P]ublic property may be applied to different uses, if they are
substantially alike, and the legislature allow." Id at 658.
317. See id. at 660-61. The court stated:
"The general purposes to which the easement was and is applied, are the same, to
wit, the purposes of a public way, to facilitate the transportation of persons and
property. Means and appliances are different, but the objects are similar, and the
legislation of the state has always favored both."
Id. at 660 (quoting Hatch v. Cincinnati & Indiana Ry., 18 Ohio St. 92,121-22 (1868)).
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easements. Although the NCDOT may act pursuant to 16 U.S.C.
§ 1247(d) to permit interim uses on preserved easements,... it has no
express, independent authority to do so under state statute.19 Also,
the NCDOT may allow recreational trail uses only on corridors
owned by the state in fee simple under North Carolina General
Statutes § 136-44.36D. 2 According to Bass and Torrence, however,
the state could permit nonrailroad transportation uses on railroad
easements without affording underlying fee owners compensation for
the change in public use. z Such authority would likely have to
derive from legislative action."
Although property owners might concede the state's power to
destroy or modify reversionary interests in railroad rights of way,3n
they would likely object to the state's authority to alter easements to
serve nonrailroad purposes." Landowners could rely on the
traditional law of easements to argue that railroads compensated
grantors of such interests based on the use of the property for
railroad uses only. Thus, according to the general common law on
the subject, any change in use would terminate the easement or
require additional compensation from the grantee or its successors in
318. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-44.36A (1993); 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1994).
319. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
320. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-44.36D (1993).
321. See Torrence v. City of Charlotte, 163 N.C. 562,565, 80 S.E. 53,54 (1913); Bass v.
Roanoke Navigation & Water Co., 111 N.C. 439,447-50, 16 S.E. 402t 404-05 (1892). If the
NCDOT did not acquire an easement outright under North Carolina General Statutes
§ 136-44.36B, some provision would have to be included to secure the consent of the
railroad to avoid a taking of corporate property without just compensation. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 136-44.36B (1993); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 284-85 (1989) (O'Connor, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that a
corporation may not have property taken for public use without affording just
compensation); see also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540, 573
(1904) (noting that although states may subject railroad rights of way to certain
restrictions, a state may not take railroad property for public use without providing just
compensation to the company).
322. Although the court in Bass suggests that reversionary interests are defeasible at
the will of the "Legislature or... the Executive Department of the state," Bass, 111 N.C. at
449, 16 S.E. at 405 (emphasis added), the facts of both Bass and Torrence involved state
legislative action condoning the change in use. See Torrence, 163 N.C. at 564, 80 S.E. at
53-54; Bass, 111 N.C. at 449, 16 S.E. at 405; Parker, supra note 31, at 303; supra notes 269-
75 and accompanying text; supra notes 299-309 and accompanying text.
323. Whether or not valid today, this rule has been upheld in a variety of contexts since
Bass. See Anderson v. Wilkins, 142 N.C. 154, 157-58, 55 S.E. 272, 273 (1906); Springs v.
Scott, 132 N.C. 548, 560, 44 S.E. 116, 120 (1903); Hodges v. Libscomb, 133 N.C. 199, 204,
45 S.E. 556, 558 (1903); supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
324. Cf. Montange, supra note 3, at 164 (noting that some states reject the "public
highway" doctrine).
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Based on the "public highway" doctrine, however, the North
Carolina legislature originally empowered railroads to condemn land
to foster the development of transportation infrastructure within the
state" To justify granting railroads the power of eminent domain,
the legislature had to recognize "railroad purposes" as "public
purposes."'  Providing transportation for the public is one of the
most fundamental public purposes of the state." Although
specifically designated as "railroad" easements, these rights of way
are in fact transportation easements." Since the state maintains a
325. See generally 1 WEBSTER, supra note 37, § 15-1 (discussing the law of easements
in North Carolina).
326. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text. The court in Bass noted:
In creating such a quasi public corporation for the purpose of opening a channel
for commerce, the parties and juries who determined values of land acquired are
deemed to have acted upon the idea then evidently controlling the Legislature,
that a great public highway would be prepared for permanent use, and that in
case one set of proprietors should forfeit their rights for misuser or nonuser, the
law-making power of the State would see that the property necessary to subserve
this important end should pass to another similar public agency or be subject to
the control of the sovereign power which had authorized it to purchase and hold
lands in fee for a particular purpose.
Bass, 111 N.C. at 447, 16 S.E. at 404; see also Raleigh & Gaston R.R. v. Davis, 19 N.C. (2
Dev. & Bat.) 451, 467 (1837) (discussing the permanent nature of the Raleigh & Gaston
Railroad: "From the great cost of this road, from its nature and supposed utility, it seems
to be contemplated to preserve it perpetually, or for a great and indefinite period."). The
court in Bass likely extracted the phrase "public highway" from language contained in the
original Roanoke Navigation Company charter- "[Tihe navigation and works of the said
company, done in pursuance of this act, when completed, shall be forever thereafter
considered as public highways, free for the transportation of all goods, wares, commodities
or produce whatsoever .... ." An Act for Improving the Navigation of Roanoke River,
Pub. L, ch. 848, art. 11 (1812).
327. See supra notes 33,144-47,284 and accompanying text.
328. See Montange, supra note 3, at 163-64.
329. See id. at 163; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-44.36A (1993) (suggesting a broader
scope of railroad corridor uses by labeling them "rail transportation corridors"). In
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 195 U.S. 540 (1904), however, the
United States Supreme Court proved reluctant to accept wholeheartedly the complete
conceptual interchangeability of railroad rights of way and other public ways:
It is contended by the Telegraph company that the charters under which the
several railway companies constituting the system of the Railroad Company were
organized expressly created them "public highways," and that in the acquisition
of land for their purposes they were public agents, "and the land was taken by the
Government, and in the eye of the law as completely subject to public uses as
though it had been taken by the state itself,"--that is to say ... have become
highways in the full sense of that word. And counsel further say the difference
between them and ordinary highways "is not a legal difference, but is the
difference of the kind of use to which the highway is subject,-in the one case,
wheel vehicles drawn by horses; in the other, to steam vehicles drawn by
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continuing interest in ensuring the integrity of transportation
easements for future use, traditional principles of easement law
should not apply to quasi-public rights of way.3" In effect, the public
should not have to pay again for a corridor originally acquired, for
all practical purposes, in perpetuity to serve transportation needs.331
Even accepting the "public highway" doctrine, landowners
would still challenge the claim that recreational trails genuinely serve
transportation purposes, especially when trail conversions provide
patrons primarily with exercise and relaxation opportunities. 2
locomotives along and upon iron rails." They are subject, therefore, it is urged,
as ordinary highways and streets of a city are subject, to the control of Congress
Counsel in advancing the argument exhibits a consciousness of taking an
extreme position. It would seem, certainly if considered with other parts of their
argument, to make a railroad right of way public property. To that extreme we
cannot go ....
Id. at 593. Although partially rejecting the telegraph company's argument in holding for
the railroad's right to compensation for use of its right of way, the Court nonetheless
recognized railroads as public highways: "The right of way of a railroad is property
devoted to a public use, and has often been called a highway, and as such is subject, to a
certain extent, to state and Federal control, and for this many cases may be cited." Id.
330. The United States Supreme Court has also recognized the distinction between
private property and railroad rights of way and the unique nature of the latter.
A railroad right of way is a very substantial thing. It is more than a mere right of
passage. It is more than a mere easement .... [I]f a railroad's right of way was
an easement it was "one having the attributes of the fee, perpetuity and exclusive
use and possession; also the remedies of the fee, and, like it, corporeal, not
incorporeal, property." And we drew support for this from a New Jersey case
.... "Unlike the use of a private way-that is, discontinuous--the use of land
condemned by a railroad company is perpetual and continuous."
Western Union Tel., 195 U.S. at 570 (quoting, respectively, New Mexico v. United States
Trust Co., 172 U.S. 171, 183 (1898), and New York, Susquehanna & Western Railroad v.
Trimmer, 53 NJ.L. 1, 3 (1890)).
331. See Parker, supra note 31, at 298 (noting that condemnors usually acquire
"perpetual easement[s]" rather than fee simple interests). It is interesting to recognize
that when a condemnor acquires an easement, damages are measured as though a fee
simple interest were being taken:
[S]ince the condemnor acquiring a perpetual easement acquires the right to
occupy and use the entire surface of the land for all time to the exclusion of the
landowner, for all practical purposes the bare fee is of no value and the damages
should be the same as if the fee were acquired. The possibility of abandonment
by the taker is so remote and improbable that it is not allowed to be taken into
consideration in determining the value of the easement.
Id. at 308. Similarly, an individual purchasing property overlain by a railroad easement
would take into account the perpetual nature of the servitude in negotiating a purchase
price. Thus, upon the termination of an easement, the underlying fee owner realizes
somewhat of an economic windfall as the "perpetual" property interest ceases to exist.
332. See Montange, supra note 3, at 163-64. Recreational trails arguably serve
transportation purposes, especially in urban areas where walking and biking trails provide
effective alternatives to the automobile in linking various trip origins and destinations.
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Although encouraging good public health might fall within the ambit
of the state's duties, railroad easements clearly were not acquired to
serve this end. This argument is quite convincing, especially when
the likelihood that an easement will return to railroad use is very
remote.3 3 Conversely, railroad easements represent one of the most
burdensome uses that could be placed upon servient estates,' 34 and
compensation awards to grantors were originally calculated
accordingly. 35 Thus, most replacement uses, especially trails, would
relieve underlying fee owners of significant practical
encumbrances.336
The most persuasive argument in favor of the "public highway"
doctrine originates not from rail corridor preservation legislation,
but from North Carolina General Statutes § 40A-10.3 37 Section 40A-
10 reads: "When any property condemned by the condemnor is no
longer needed for the purpose for which it was condemned, it may be
used for any other public purpose or may be sold or disposed of in
the manner prescribed by law for the sale and disposition of surplus
property." '338 According to § 40A-10, a railroad could authorize any
public use on its right of way without compensating the owners of
servient estates or reversionary interests.339  Presumably, the
Adjacent property owners, however, may have stronger takings claims for those trail
conversions intended to provide patrons primarily with exercise and relaxation
opportunities and not transportation alternatives for getting from one point to another.
See id. at 164-65.
333. The "interim" trail use may be practically permanent in nature. See id.; Henick,
supra note 75, at 80. Section 1247(d) of the National Trails Act, for instance, places no
time limit on interim uses. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1994).
334. See Montange, supra note 3, at 164.
335. See Bass v. Roanoke Navigation & Water Power Co., 111 N.C. 439, 447, 16 S.E.
402, 404 (1892); Montange, supra note 3, at 164.
336. Besides the noise and negative aesthetic qualities of railroads in general, these
rights of way limit landowners' access to areas across the tracks. See Montange, supra
note 3, at 164. Of course, much may depend on how a court defines "burden" in this type
of analysis. If a court adopts a narrow interpretation of "burden" as including any change
in use, then a trail conversion would likely fail the "burden" test. If a court perceives a
"burden" instead as relating to the physical encumbrances placed upon a property, then
trail advocates should prevail. Compare Swaim v. Simpson, 120 N.C. App. 863,864-65,463
S.E.2d 785,787 (1995) (holding that placement of utility lines on an easement granted only
for ingress and egress to a residence constitutes an additional burden on the servient
estate), aff'd mem., 343 N.C. 298, 469 S.E.2d 553 (1996), with id. at 865, 463 S.E.2d at 787
(Johnson, J., dissenting) (arguing that utility lines would not impose an additional burden
on the servient estate where residential lot owners acquired the easement for access to
property).
337. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-10 (1984).
338. Id.
339. Railroads fall within the scope of § 40A-10 by virtue of North Carolina General
Statutes §§ 40A-2(2), 40A-3(a)(4), which identify railroads as "condemnors" governed by
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NCDOT, as a successor in interest to railroad property" and
condemnor in its own right,mi could also change the use of an
easement or qualified fee estate to serve any public purpose.
Although the NCDOT may have no express authority to implement
recreational uses on railroad easements, § 40A-10 may implicitly
grant the department the power it needs to do so, at least with regard
to condemned easements.
Whether a rail line came into being by virtue of eminent domain
or agreement, however, should not matter in determining the scope
of the legislature's power to modify the use of a right of way. 2 To
conclude otherwise would result in a patchwork of broken corridors
incapable of serving any useful transportation purpose. Applying
the holdings in Bass and Torrence only to condemned rights of way
would leave gaps in corridors where a railroad acquired property by
means other than eminent domain.?3 This result would defeat the
legislature's policy objective, as identified in Bass, of preserving
contiguous transportation corridors for future transportation use.'
Such an outcome would also undermine the unstated objective in
§ 40A-10 of preserving public and quasi-public property for future
public use? 5 The state can not rely on railroad corporations to
achieve these public goals. After all, although railroads may be
quasi-public corporations, the private motive for profit will
inexorably lead to right of way abandonments beneficial to the
"bottom line,"' but harmful to the present or future public interest.
the eminent domain procedures contained in Chapter 40A. See id §§ 40A-2(2), -3(a)(4);
see also id § 40A-1 (stating that Chapter 40A contains exclusive provisions for eminent
domain as among identified condemnors).
340. The NCDOT may acquire railroad property. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-44.36B
(1993).
341. The NCDOT may acquire property by condemnation for a variety of purposes.
See, e.g., id. § 136-18(2), (3), (16) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (authorizing condemnation to
acquire rights of way for roads and highways and the materials necessary to build them);
ii § 136-89.52 (authorizing condemnation to acquire right of way for limited access
highways).
342. Cf. Bass v. Roanoke Navigation & Water Power Co., 111 N.C. 439, 447, 16 S.E.
402, 404 (1892) (discussing the legislature's authority as to rights of way whether acquired
by agreement or condemnation).
343. See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text (noting the various property
interests acquired by railroads in establishing their rights of way).
344. See Bass, 111 N.C. at 447-49,16 S.E. at 404-05; supra note 326 (quoting Bass).
345. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A-10 (1994).
346. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (discussing fiscal factors motivating




Principles of law affecting railroad rights of way have evolved
significantly since the first steam locomotives appeared on the
American landscape over 160 years ago. Even today, this area of the
law stands on the brink of change as contemporary transportation
problems promise to reawaken doctrines of property and railroad
law that have lain dormant since the early part of this century. In
North Carolina, particularly, the "public highway" doctrine may
offer legislators and planners an opportunity to save railroad
easements for future transportation use without compensating
underlying fee owners for the alteration of the easements or the
indefinite postponement of their termination. Of course, issues of
title and abandonment will likely arise in any right of way case
determining the extent and integrity of the railroad's property
interest.
The controversy surrounding the Wallace-Castle Hayne rail
corridor illuminates these and other issues as they pertain to the
public's efforts to preserve rail corridors for interim and future uses.
The Wilmington & Weldon, for instance, acquired its right of way in
an era when broad legislative grants of authority allowed railroads to
condemn corridors in fee simple. Whereas the corporate successor
to the Wilmington & Weldon can only take easements by eminent
domain, a court today may find a fee simple interest in any
condemned portions of the Wallace-Castle Hayne corridor in a
contemporary legal setting generally opposed to such a result.
Questions of abandonment may also surface in any Wallace-Castle
Hayne litigation. The removal of tracks from the corridor, the
NCDOT's efforts to establish an intent to preserve the right of way,
and the fact that the railroad conveyed the corridor for future
railroad use represent general considerations that would prove
relevant in any abandonment analysis.
If the NCDOT holds the Wallace-Castle Hayne corridor intact
in qualified fee or easement, the destructibility of reversionary
interests and the "public highway" doctrine may provide the state
constitutional justifications to preserve the line for future
transportation use. Whether recreational trails fall under the ambit
of permissible transportation purposes remains to be seen. In any
case, under existing statutes the state has chosen not to exercise
explicitly its apparent authority to dedicate railroad easements to
nonrailroad uses. Thus, the NCDOT could sanction an interim trail
use on the Wallace-Castle Hayne corridor only if the railroad
originally acquired a fee simple interest in the right of way. The
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scarcity of modem case law addressing the "public highway" doctrine
leaves many unanswered questions about the applicability of the
principle to contemporary disputes surrounding corridor
preservation efforts.
In light of these uncertainties, modem legislators and courts
should attempt to reconcile the policy objectives of transportation
planners with the constitutional rights of landowners sharing their
borders with long-established railroad rights of way. To accomplish
this formidable task, jurists and legislators will have to merge legal
concepts emanating from different areas of the law rich in history
and tradition. Fortunately, in North Carolina, this balancing process
began over a hundred years ago. Although much has changed in the
ways we live and travel, the need for transportation still remains.
While unused railroad corridors offer potential for supplementing
the demands of today's highway-traveling public, their future use will
require flexible legal doctrines to accommodate changing
transportation priorities and technologies 7
JEFFREY ALAN BANDINI
347. The timeless quality of this necessity is reflected in an 1876 opinion written by
Ohio Supreme Court Justice Wright: "[Rights of way] can not be confined solely to the
uses to which they were adapted in the primitive state of mankind." Malone v. City of
Toledo, 28 Ohio St. 643,661 (1876).
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